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The Role of Ideology in the U.S. Foreign Policy of George W. 
Bush in Iraq and Barack H. Obama in Syria 
 
Maya Sami el Gharib 
 
ABSTRACT 
Iraq and Syria have been at the heart of US Middle East foreign policy for some 
time. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 were followed by a fundamental 
shift in US foreign policy that emanated from the neo-conservative powers in the 
administration of George W. Bush. The ‘Bush Doctrine’ abandoned the prevailing 
realism of US foreign policy at the time and instituted a muscular Wilsonian 
approach that valued big-stick diplomacy and unilateral action to safeguard US 
interests and maintain its unipolar prominence on the world stage, while advocating 
the merits of spreading democracy and American values in the region. Barack H. 
Obama inherited the chaotic aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq and a region 
destabilized by popular uprisings against autocratic regimes, the most violent of 
which was in Syria. US foreign policy under Obama diverged significantly from that 
of his predecessor and shunned ideology in favor of a Jeffersonian approach. In an 
integration of both realism and idealism, the Obama administration believes 
democratic reform of authoritarian regimes cannot be imposed extrinsically by 
overwhelming force, and US military might is not a suitable instrument of regime 
change. Obama’s foreign policy in Syria is derived from a soft-realist approach that 
values caution, restraint and multilateral consensus and upholds US strategic 
interests over all other considerations. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction to the Thesis:  
Two nations in the Middle East, Iraq and Syria, have been the focus of two 
recent US administrations to varying degrees and during over-lapping time periods. This 
thesis tackles the impact of the neoconservative ideology of the George W. Bush 
administration and the soft realist approach of Barack H. Obama on US policy in Iraq 
and Syria, respectively. In so doing, this thesis examines the impact of ideology on US 
foreign policy in the Middle East. The research uses the comparative approach to 
explain the effect of different ideologies on US Middle East policy.  
 
1.2 US Interests in the Middle East: 
The Middle East region has always been of crucial importance to the United 
States. Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor to President Jimmy Carter from 
1977-1981, once described the Middle East as that portion of the world “which stretches 
along the shores of the Indian Ocean, with fragile social and political structures in a 
region of vital importance to us, threatened with fragmentation. The resulting political 
chaos could well be filled by elements hostile to our values and sympathetic to our 
adversaries” (Hashemi, 2012, p. 38-9). Naturally, most nations in the Middle East differ 
from the US on many levels including cultural, political, and social. The US has 
demonstrated time and again that it is ready to engage directly in the Middle East when 
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its strategic interests or security needs are at stake. Historically, the two pivotal interests 
have been the protection of oil supply and the security of its ally Israel. An ‘OPEC share 
of world crude oil reserves’ survey conducted in 2013, shows that the bulk of oil 
reserves, around 66%, come from OPEC member countries from the Middle East. Saudi 
Arabia constitutes 22% of reserves while Iraq accounts for around 16% of reserves 
(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC], 2015)
1
. Israel, the closest 
and most strategic political ally of the US in the Middle East, has always relied on US 
support whether directly in terms of financial funding for its military and provision of 
the latest and most advanced weapon systems or indirectly in diplomatic support on the 
world stage. 
With these key interests in mind, a brief overview will follow detailing the recent 
history and key developments in US foreign policy in Iraq and Syria and how the Bush 
and Obama administrations have differed in their approach. 
 
1.3  Iraq in US Foreign Policy: 
Bush’s doctrine while waging a war on Iraq in 2003 has been described as 
“Wilsonianism with teeth” (Mearsheimer, 2005, p. 1). Wilsonianism is an ideological 
perspective on foreign policy derived from the paradigm of idealism. It is attributed to 
US President Woodrow Wilson and advocates the promotion of democracy and 
capitalism in order to promote world peace. In a sense, Bush’s doctrine added a 
militaristic element - the “teeth” - to the ideological strand of Wilsonianism to provide 
the doctrine with power and enforceability. To initially understand the difference 
                                                          
1 http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm 
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between Iraq and Syria, one has to go back to the question of when did the governments 
of Saddam Hussein and Bashar al-Assad become a priority for the US to address? How 
do these countries and their geopolitical roles in the region influence US national 
interests, shape its foreign policy, and affect its allies? The idea of ousting Saddam 
Hussein was initiated before the terrorist attacks on US soil in 2001. According to 
Russell A. Burgos, “the Bush administration’s construction of Iraq after the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks was not a sui generis, but was derived from an understanding 
of how to the solve the Iraq problem that had already been embedded in American 
foreign policy discourse” (Burgos, 2008, p. 224). Regime change discourse among 
members of the administration preceded the events of 9/11. 
The terrorist attacks that occurred on 9/11 and the US administration’s need to 
respond to those attacks are indispensable, but not sufficient, in explaining the 2003 
invasion of Iraq. To better understand the US stance against Saddam Hussein we need to 
go back to the presidency and administration of George H.W. Bush and the Persian Gulf 
War. Operation Desert Storm, which began in August of 1990 and continued to February 
of 1991, was a war waged against Saddam’s army in Kuwait and Iraq and by US-led 
coalition forces from thirty-four nations and resulted in the defeat of the Iraqi army and 
the ending of its occupation of Kuwait. President George H.W. Bush, at the conclusion 
of military action, praised Operation Desert Storm as a strategic and moral victory. 
Nonetheless, Bush Sr. was met by criticism back home for not completing the task of 
removing Saddam and his Baath regime from power (Maddow, 2013). This was despite 
the fact that the sovereignty of Kuwait was restored and the regional balance of power 
had swung back in favor of US interests. There was apparently no military plan in place 
to oust Saddam Hussein from power. Collin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
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Staff and the highest ranking officer in the US Armed Forces during Desert Storm, 
clearly states that this was not an objective of the operation. “In none of the meetings I 
attended was dismembering Iraq, conquering Baghdad or changing the Iraqi form of 
government ever seriously considered”, states Powell (Burgos, 2008, p. 237-8). Dick 
Cheney, the secretary of defense in the George H.W. administration, fully supported the 
president’s restraint policy in the early 1990s. That political stance from Cheney, 
however, would not last for long. The conservatives within the administration and the 
intellectuals outside the government did not stop criticizing the outcome of Desert Storm 
and lobbied for the demise of Saddam’s regime. Following President Bill Clinton’s 
election, the proponents of regime change redirected the substantive meaning of the 
“Iraq threat”. The deterrence and containment strategy that the Clinton administration 
had been practicing at the time were being attacked as a viable policy (Burgos, 2008, p.  
222). Increasingly the situation in Iraq came to be seen as a “Saddam problem”. In 1998, 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz, working under Secretary of 
Defense Cheney, was one of the main advocates of regime change in Iraq, publicly 
urging for Saddam’s removal. With the George W. Bush administration at the helm in 
2000, hawks from both the Democrat and Republican parties, the principal political 
parties in the US, were expressing support for severe measures aimed at rolling back the 
rogue regime in Iraq and possibly removing Saddam from power (Burgos, 2008, p. 246). 
What served to push the US towards a second war in Iraq was the coming together of 
several factors and circumstances. President Bush and his team of neoconservative 
hardliners in power along with a Republican majority in the US House of Congress, 
bolstered by the perception of success in the war in Afghanistan which was relatively 
inexpensive, along with the elevated support of the Bush administration among an 
5 
 
American public angered and fearful following the civilian deaths on 9/11, all of this 
made it easier to authorize the use of military power to remove Saddam under the banner 
of neutralizing a threat in the Middle East region and removing Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD)– in the name of democracy and implementing the ‘War on Terror’. 
The next section addresses Obama’s foreign policy towards Syria’s conflict and 
Bashar’s regime, including the fluctuating relationship between Syria and Washington 
since the Reagan administration until present day. 
 
1.4 Syria in US Foreign Policy: 
Syria has always played a pivotal role in Washington’s Middle East calculations. 
Syria serves as a geopolitical interest to the US because it also shares borders with Iraq, 
Turkey, Lebanon and Israel, thus placing it in a critical position that can thwart or 
expand US strategic goals. US policy towards Syria has profoundly been affected by a 
realist approach that was largely visible and popular since the presidency of Ronald 
Reagan and continues to the present day. After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Syria’s 
role became more problematic for Washington. The US accused Syria of harboring and 
training terrorists and insurgents that relocated to Iraq. In October 2008, a few days 
before the US presidential elections, military helicopters were dispatched to attack the 
known locations in Syria of individuals that the Bush administration believed were 
aiding Iraqi insurgents (Sadat & Jones, 2009). 
Within a couple of years following Obama’s presidential election, Washington’s 
foreign policy in Syria was given an opportunity to evolve and gradually improve with 
cautious yet valid diplomacy. The downward spiral of deterioration begun in 2004 
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following US ratification of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 that stipulated the 
departure of the Syrian Army from Lebanon and followed by the implication of the 
Syrian regime in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic al-Hariri by 
the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon in 2005 (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar, 
2012). This deterioration continued for almost five years. However, by 2009, there was a 
turning of a new page with the Assad regime. First signs of this kind of effort emerged 
with the reassignment of the US Ambassador Robert Ford to Damascus after a five year 
absence following Hariri’s assassination. Many US congressional members of both 
parties and even representatives from the executive branch frequently met with Syrian 
officials. In effect, both countries were determined to re-launch US-Syria relations. In 
the middle of 2010, the US started to differentiate between the regime of Bashar al-
Assad and the then Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi, referring to Gaddafi as a mad 
man, even stating that Bashar was a different leader than his late father President Hafez 
al-Assad, hoping that the son might be a reformer (Goodenough, 2011). When popular 
protests in Syria started surfacing in the early spring of 2011, former secretary of state 
Hillary Clinton referred to Assad as a “reformer”, a president that will answer the 
demands of his people for change. Prospects for an improvement in the relationship 
between the West and Syria comprising diplomatic engagement, and economic 
opportunities to follow, were on the brink of solidifying. However, this political 
endeavor was about to take a turn for the worse when the Arab Spring started. In the 
summer of 2011, the US denounced Bashar’s oppressive crackdowns of the popular 
protests that resulted in many casualties, asking him to step down from the presidency.  
  In July and August 2013, the alleged use by the Syrian army of chemical 
weapons against civilians forced Obama to declare that this was a dangerous violation 
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that had crossed a “red line” previously established by his administration. This 
declaration, however, in reality had no clear implications or outlined consequences. 
Obama threatened retaliation with limited air strikes to punish Bashar’s regime for 
causing severe harm to the Syrian civilians and prevent the Syrian army from further use 
of chemical weapons. By the end of August 2013, Obama did start planning for a limited 
strike option, however, this was put on hold due to Obama seeking pending approval and 
support from US Congress. It may be argued that the Obama administration was not 
eager to engage militarily in Syria and floated the idea of air strikes to save face because 
its “red line” was crossed and the approval from US Congress was a political maneuver 
to avoid military action. An alternative to military action presented itself shortly 
thereafter in the form of a deal arrived at during talks between Secretary of State John 
Kerry and the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in which the Syrian regime 
would hand over all chemical weapons in their possession to the US for destruction. 
Effectively, the unintended consequences of this deal have been the easing of 
international pressure on Assad and continued inaction on the part of the US 
administration and providing only verbal support to the moderate opposition group, the 
Syrian National Coalition (SNC) (Rothkopf, 2014). The civil unrest in Syria 
consequently escalated, turning into a sectarian war. The turbulence of this conflict has 
crossed over the shared borders with its neighbors. The threat of ISIS (or ISIL - Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria) has emerged as a powerful destructive force in the region. As of 
early December 2014, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights has claimed the killing 
of 202,354 people since popular protests in Syria erupted in March 2011. Of this total 
number 63,074 were civilians, among the causalities 10,377 were children and the death 
toll in this turbulent nation continues to rise (Al-Arabiya News, 2014). According to the 
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United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 3,725,685 million (last updated on 
January 26, 2015) Syrian refugees have been registered as displaced throughout 
Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt and Iraq since the start of Syria’s civil war. This figure does not 
take into account the unrecorded numbers of Syrian civilians who fled from the conflict 
and those whose exact whereabouts are unknown (United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees [UNHCR], 2015). The three questions in the following segment help in 
explaining the argument of this Thesis and aid in differentiating between the hardline 
neoconservative foreign policy adopted by Bush in his invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the 
“soft” realist behavior of Obama’s foreign policy, loosely referred to as a doctrine, 
regarding President Bashar al-Assad and Syria. 
 
1.5 Research Questions: 
To what degree was the policy of the Bush administration in the lead-up to Iraq’s 
invasion in 2003 driven by neoconservative ideology? The discussion in the subsequent 
chapters will demonstrate that neoconservatives believe in big-stick diplomacy and 
perceive a return to a multipolar balance-of-power as a hindrance to American national 
interests and a threat to its security and the international order. The Bush administration, 
under the influence of neoconservative ideology, formed a doctrine that had four major 
tenets and all were influential in building the rationale for invading Iraq. The first, 
referred to as bandwagoning, is the belief that once Iraq is invaded and Saddam Hussein 
is ousted other regional players would be threatened by the US military show of force, 
surrender and jump on the US ‘bandwagon’. When given the opportunity for 
democratization from the US, all the people will aspire to and eventually support 
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democracy. Second, and perhaps most controversial element of the Bush Doctrine, is the 
policy of preemption and the use of military force rather than diplomatic deterrence 
when dealing with rogue states. Thirdly, the Bush doctrine values a unipolar 
international system and unilateralism. Finally, the promotion of democracy and the 
democratic-peace theory which posits that democracies are unlikely to engage in hostile 
actions against other democracies and a Middle East with more democratic regimes 
would provide for peace and stability in this vital region with important US interests 
including oil and security of Israel. Mearsheimer (2005) characterizes the Bush Doctrine 
as “Wilsonianism with teeth” (Schmidt & Williams, 2008, p. 199). It in many ways 
echoes President Theodore Roosevelt’s mantra of “walk softly and carry a big stick”. 
Can Obama’s foreign policy with respect to Syria be simply defined as ‘soft 
realism’? To what extent is he a Jeffersonian president and does his foreign policy move 
away from a set of ideologies? In a speech in 2006, and prior to the announcement of his 
presidential candidacy, Obama stated that he favors “a strategy no longer driven by 
ideology and politics but one that is based on a realistic assessment of the sobering facts 
on the ground and our interests in the region” (Lizza, 2011, para. 4). The Jeffersonian 
approach, which values caution and restraint, is at the root of Obama’s soft-realist 
foreign policy when it comes to the question of military intervention in Syria. The 
underlying rhetoric in many of Obama’s speeches concerning the Arab uprisings is 
based on one of the views of idealism, where right is preferred over might when 
compromises have to be made (Atlas, 2012). Obama’s policy since his first term has 
been to integrate the principles of both realism and idealism.    
How does Obama’s foreign policy in Syria today differ from the Bush Doctrine? 
There are some similarities between the scenario in Syria today and that in Iraq 
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preceding the US invasion in 2003, namely that an authoritarian regime is committing 
violence against its own people, including the use of chemical weapons, and there is a 
possibility that US allies and regional interests may be at stake. The foreign policy of 
Obama, however, lies in stark contrast to that of his predecessor. The Bush Doctrine 
believed that it can deliver democracy and freedom to the people of Iraq by extrinsic 
force whereas Obama’s administration believes that only intrinsic efforts including the 
cooperation of governments and the people can lead to political reform and stable 
change and this is lacking in Syria. While an argument can be made for intervention in 
Syria on a humanitarian basis, to relieve the suffering of innocent civilians who are 
caught in the crossfire between the warring factions, Obama has made it clear that the 
era of unilateral action on the part of the United States has ended and that the US will 
only intervene in humanitarian endeavors as part of a multinational coalition. The 
exception to this rule is any situation in which core US interests are threatened and that 
is not the case in Syria. While the Bush administration was willing to make an example 
of its use of force in Iraq to bandwagon the regional players toward democracy – while 
imposing a global ‘muscular’ Wilsonian stance – the Jeffersonian approach of Obama 
views the American model of democratic governance as an organic product of US 
history and unique American experience and not a template that can readily be 
duplicated elsewhere. The differences between the role played by the US in Iraq versus 
in Syria is not only a result of differences in timing, mineral wealth or strategic interests, 
but rather is the manifestation of a profound difference in foreign policy, ideology, and 
in how each administration views the world and the leadership role the US can and 
should play.   
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1.6 Methodology:  
Foreign policy can be assessed from many different perspectives. Starting at the 
inception, one can examine the cultural and historical elements woven into the fabric of 
a nation and its governance system and follow those threads as they merge to form a 
particular foreign policy view. Alternatively, an appraisal may focus on how well 
foreign policy is implemented and effectively translated from theory into action by a 
given administration as well as examining outcomes and end results. Equally as valid 
would be an evaluation based on the manner in which these policies are received and 
reciprocated by the world community.  
As outlined in the research questions above, this thesis explains the differences in 
the foreign policy responses between the Bush and Obama administrations in Iraq and 
Syria respectively. The thesis focuses on the role played by ideology, the shaping of 
each administration’s response to threat perceptions in Iraq and Syria. As the thesis later 
discusses, the ideological differences between the Bush and Obama administrations are 
substantial, mainly because of the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001 and their 
aftermath. Consequently, ideology serves as an explanatory variable of the variations in 
the Bush and Obama’s foreign policy responses to crises in Iraq and Syria. 
A comparative analysis of the role of ideology in US foreign policy under 
Presidents Bush and Obama will be made by utilizing the events in Iraq in 2003 and 
Syria since 2011 as case studies. These were selected due to the fact that they share 
many similarities in the circumstances on the ground prior to any US intervention – 
authoritarian regimes committing violence against their own people with increased risks 
for US allies and regional interests – and yet have been addressed in a very different 
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manner by each administration. This difference in approach and method of US 
intervention stems primarily from the presence of a specific neoconservative ideology in 
the US administration under President Bush that is absent from that of President Obama. 
US foreign policy on Iraq and Syria are reviewed and discussed based on a 
comparative analysis and a qualitative research. Documentation and information are 
gathered from secondary sources. The collected information is from journals, literature 
from political analysts, databases, publications and journalists from prominent news 
agents, such as Foreign Policy, The Washington Post, The National, The Atlantic, The 
New Yorker, and Council on Foreign Relations. The interviews are with President 
Barack H. Obama and former US Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton. A 
comparative research approach is utilized to demonstrate how ideological changes 
across the last two US administrations help explain US foreign policy differences vis-à-
vis Iraq and Syria.  
 
1.7 Map of the Thesis:  
  This thesis is divided into five chapters. The introduction sets the stage for the 
later discussion with a historical background of the Bush and Obama administration in 
respect to their foreign policy towards Iraq and Syria. The second chapter reviews the 
relevant literature that addresses concepts and facts critical for understanding their 
ideology and policy differences. Chapter three discusses the role of ideology in George 
W. Bush’s foreign policy and the impact of the Bush Doctrine in the lead-up to and 
throughout the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and how it affected the rest of the Middle 
East. It also addresses the question if the aim of the war was to promote democracy or to 
13 
 
secure oil fields in Iraq? Chapter four examines Obama’s soft-realist policy in Syria and 
how it affects the Middle East. Is there an Obama Doctrine or even an ideological 
framework in his policy? It also includes a discussion about policy options in Syria and 
an analysis as to why it chooses not to militarily and directly intervene and remove 
Bashar’s regime. Chapter five concludes with a summary of the pertinent points and an 
analysis of the gathered data regarding the ideology and foreign policy of Bush and 
Obama. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction: 
Chapter two is divided into two parts; the first part reviews the relevant literature 
regarding Bush’s ideological foreign policy towards Saddam Hussein and Iraq. The 
literature about George W. Bush’s administration allows the reader to understand the 
shift from a US realist foreign policy that had been applied by various US 
administrations since the Cold War. The first part also offers different perspectives in 
understanding how the decision to invade Iraq came to be and the neoconservative 
motives behind Saddam’s removal and democracy promotion in Iraq. According to 
political scholars examined in this thesis, the idea of regime change had already existed 
before the 9/11 terrorists attacks. After those attacks, realism was marginalized in order 
to pursue neoconservative US foreign policy in the Middle East, starting with Iraq, 
through a unilateral decision to utilize big-stick diplomacy to promote democracy and 
bolster the US ‘War on Terror’. The second portion of the chapter will examine the 
Obama’s administration stance towards Syria’s regime and civil war. The authors try to 
expose and comprehend the reasons why Obama seems to be caught in a situation where 
maneuvers and decisions are limited, while some of them also prescribe ways in which 
Obama can contain the conflict in Syria. Further examined factors pertaining to the 
thesis topic include the role of ideology in Bush’s ‘muscular’ Wilsonian idealist Iraq 
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strategy in comparison to Obama’s soft-realist Syria policy that can be understood from 
a Jeffersonian approach. 
 
2.2 Bush’s Foreign Policy Towards Saddam and Iraq:  
The literature review begins with Bush’s neoconservative foreign policy towards 
Saddam’s authoritarian regime and its implication in Iraq. The first section of this 
chapter is about the role of ideology in Bush’s policy in the lead-up to and throughout 
Iraq’s war explained from the perspectives of International Relations (IR) theories by 
academic analysts of IR paradigms that include Walt, Jervis and Snyder. Important 
perspectives from various authors are also explored. Mearsheimer discusses the failure 
of the Bush administration in assessing pragmatic factors after Iraq’s invasion and the 
ineffectiveness of US bandwagoning. Hinnebusch explores factors contributing to the 
decision-making process of invading Iraq, while simultaneously buttressing the theory of 
US Empire in explaining US objectives regarding Iraq’s war. Burgos asserts that 
“regime change hawks” had already promoted the idea of regime change in Iraq well 
before George W. became president in January 2001. Schmidt and Williams discuss how 
realists failed in highlighting American values in their US foreign policy choices. 
Fawcett, claims that’s Iraq’s war has largely influenced the rise of the Arab Uprisings. 
Gause argues against those who perceive that the US invaded Iraq for control of its oil 
and energy. The following part will explain these authors’ assertions in more detail.      
Stephen M. Walt (1998, p. 30) suggests that, “no single approach can capture all 
the complexity of contemporary world politics”. While different political theories can 
reveal the strengths and weaknesses of each other, even calling out for subsequent 
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adjustments, diverse contemporary schools of thought should be accepted and promoted. 
It was the realist theoretical approach in international affairs that took center stage 
throughout the Cold War. “Classical” realists, such as Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold 
Niebhur, believed that it was inherent for states just like human beings to try to dominate 
others, while modern realists find the underlying sources are “opportunities and 
temptations presented by the international environment” (Jervis, 2003, p. 317). The 
offense-defense theory on the other end of realism’s spectrum would argue that when 
defense is easier than offense, states will eventually form balancing alliances and 
position themselves with a defensive rather than an offensive military power. We can 
witness this kind of approach today between Russia and China on one hand and the US, 
France and Britain on the other with the former member states vetoing UN Security 
Council sanctions condemning President Bashar al Assad’s regime.  
 Robert L. Jervis offers a different perspective that can be comprehended from a 
tangible angle about Bush’s Iraq policy that other scholars might strongly dissent to, 
since realists and neoconservatives were publicly competing for their influence and 
power in US foreign policy debate in the early 2000s. Jervis contends that “Offensive 
Realism perhaps provides the best explanation for what the US is doing because it sees 
states as always wanting more power in order to try to gain more security for an 
uncertain future” (Jervis, 2003, p. 316). Bush had stated in a speech in October 2002: 
‘We will not live in fear’, (Jervis, 2003, p. 317). The psychological feeling of 
uncertainty had profoundly affected the US public after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The 
US president and his administration at the time, through the savvy use of media, cleverly 
built a strong political case for the US to take action. They convinced the public that 
inaction would consequently cause more harm to the US.  Bush’s administration was 
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finally able to forgo Clinton’s policy of containment and deterrence. In effect, they 
advocated for the use of brute force and a policy of preemptive war, because they 
believed that it can create the effective objective of ousting Saddam. As Jervis (2003) 
stated, Bush and his colleagues did not concur with Stephen Waltz’s argument that 
nuclear proliferation will spread deterrence and render nuclear stability or would 
moderate behavior of ‘evil’ states. Jervis claims that, the Bush administration perceived 
coercion and deterrence in particular as ineffective policies when dealing with tyrants 
and terrorists (Jervis, 2003). Therefore, because the Bush administration strived for 
American security, global stability, the reconstruction of international politics and the 
spread of democracy in nations with authoritarian regimes hostile to the US, preemptive 
war was the clear course of action for the US in Iraq.  
Jack Snyder makes a legitimate point about IR theories today. He argues that 
idealism, realism and liberalism take on the role of “intellectual window dressing”, and 
they are often insufficient in explaining how policymaking and public debate work in the 
political world (Snyder, 2004, p. 54). According to Snyder (2004), realism was 
successful in explaining US imperial behavior: when its power rises it will employ its 
military to enhance its control of region. Nonetheless, events that followed 9/11 
undermined one of realism’s main views which predicts, that weak states will align with 
each other to protect themselves from a stronger state, thus reshuffling the balance of 
power. Similarly, liberalism may explain why the Bush administration sought to rally for 
democratic values in Iraq, yet it simultaneously ignored the vital role of international 
institutions which are equally important in liberalism’s agenda.  
Similarly, John Mearsheimer (2005) underscores how the Bush administration 
did not take into account the assessment of realistic factors on the grounds and the effect 
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it would have on Middle East nations that strongly opposed US intervention in Iraq. 
There was a military strategic plan for Iraq but a blueprint detailing how the process of 
democratization would proceed was hardly existent. This discrepancy undermines those 
among the neoconservatives who would proclaim that Wilsonian idealism and a desire 
to bring freedom to Iraq’s people was an important consideration for the Bush 
administration.  
Mearsheimer (2004) explains that the neocons believed in big-stick diplomacy: 
military power that facilitates unilateral decisions. Iran, North Korea, and other potential 
troublemakers in the Arab World would be threatened by the US military show of force, 
surrender and jump on the US bandwagon, ultimately proving bandwagoning’s “domino 
theory”. The Bush’s administration faith in the doctrine of ‘revolution in military affair 
s’ (RMA), made them believe that their strategy would be efficient and effective in a 
relatively short amount of time. However, he claims that RMA is ineffective in fighting 
back an insurgency and the US does not have much success in nation-building especially 
in a nation with barely any experience in democracy (Mearsheimer, 2005).  
Raymond Hinnebusch (2007) is in search of an IR theory that can explain what 
drove the US to invade Iraq since the realist perspective falls short. He argues that 
Western-style ideology and multiple dynamics in congruence with each other led to the 
invasion of Iraq. It was a combination of Israel, oil resources and American 
exceptionalism. Still, he cautions that “these elements would be more convincing if they 
were subsumed within a broader theoretical perspective” (Hinnebusch, 2007, p. 212).  
He suggests that theories of empire must be underlined and the idea of US Empire must 
be reinstated into political discourse. He continues to argue that the problem was not 
derived from the threat of using WMD against the US; the real threat came from 
19 
 
Saddam’s regime. Hinnebusch (2007) discusses US foreign policy in terms of its interest 
in Iraq’s oil and the reasons for its hegemony over the oil market. The Iraq war was 
about the US situating its global position as an empire. Hinnebusch’s US Empire theory 
holds credibility in explaining a few factors yet cannot explain the behavior of the Bush 
administration following the invasion. In his second presidential term, George W. Bush 
downsized the role of American exceptionalism in the region because of the escalating 
costs and insurgency in Iraq and was further dissuaded in promoting democracy in the 
Middle East when Hamas won a major parliamentary share in the 2006 Palestinian 
elections. 
  Russel A. Burgos (2008) advocates that the ouster of Saddam Hussein was 
rooted in US foreign policy well before the presidency of George W. Bush, and did not 
result from the idiosyncratic decision-making process of the neoconservatives. He 
argues that changes in political discourse “result from a dynamic interaction between 
competing ideas and material events in the international system” (Burgos, 2008, p. 223) 
and not from individuals and this can help us understand how the neoconservatives 
chose the path of military intervention. The “regime change hawks”, as Burgos labels 
them, (Burgos, 2008, p. 226), had the ‘Ideapolitik’ of regime change in full effect by the 
early 2000s. Throughout the 1990s, the problem went from being Iraq to Saddam and 
the only effective solution was regime change. The ‘Iraq Liberation Act of 1998’ can 
further justify that the removal of Saddam was well established before Bush had entered 
the White House in 2000.  
 Brian C. Schmidt and Michael C. Williams (2008) argue that the neocons and 
realists were in a war of debates centered over whether or not it was in America’s 
interests to invade Iraq. The former criticized and tried to weaken realism’s balance-of-
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power, while praising their theory of bandwagoning (Schmidt & Williams, 2008). The 
neoconservatives claimed they were rightly speaking of and protecting American 
interests and values globally. Neo-conservatives were successful in building a vast social 
support for the war in the lead-up to Iraq’s invasion. Realists were not as popular in 
conveying their message to the public, because they failed to emphasize American 
values in their foreign policy preferences. Ever since the outcome of the Iraq war, neo-
conservatism has gradually waned in US foreign policy. The realists have gained back 
their momentum, because balance-of-power and protection of interests are what the US 
values the most in the Middle East. Realists, on the other hand, do not portray 
themselves as the agents of spreading democracy and American exceptionalism. In 
concurrence with Schmidt and Williams (2008), realists need to work harder on 
explaining their policy choices and its conceivable outcome.   
Louise Fawcett (2013) claims that there is a link between the downfall of 
Saddam Hussein and subsequent uprisings in the Arab spring. She explains how the Iraq 
War has had a significant impact on the domestic, regional and international level. She 
gives an example of how the jihadi or resistance movements that were developed in 
response to the war later redeployed in Syria and Iraq. In effect, this is triggering a new 
regional balance of power in the Middle East, further dividing the interests of the Sunni 
Gulf monarchies and the Shiites of Iran and its allies. Fawcett (2013) claims that the Iraq 
war is not credited for being the only agent of instigating change in the Arab uprisings 
yet it did act as a ‘catalyst’. This may be true to a certain extent, however, the Iraq war 
was a foreign intervention and it differs from events in Arab Spring nations in that 
change originated there primarily from national movements in a bottom-up direction. 
And in the case of Iraq, the Iraqi people did not plead for US intervention, while the 
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natives of some nations that underwent (or are undergoing) revolutions were requesting 
international aid.    
Gregory Gause, III (2010) argues against critics of Iraq’s war that claim that 9/11 
only served as a pretext for the US invasion of Iraq. He objects to those who claim that 
the true motives of the invasion were American imperial expansion and control of Iraq’s 
oil reserves and empowerment of US energy corporations while at the same time 
securing Israel’s dominance. He argues that the post-war failure in locating WMDs 
counters critics’ aforementioned assertions. The US did not sign any substantial oil 
development contracts after the war. Only a Chinese company was able to guarantee a 
contract with a new Iraqi oil field by the end of 2008. Gause (2010) also defends the 
Bush Doctrine against those who argue that plans to democratize Iraq were an 
afterthought and an attempt to evade criticism of pre-war intelligence asserting the 
presence of Iraqi WMD. The neocons defend their position by stating that plans to 
reform the Middle East were part of US policy since the lead-up to the war. The war’s 
target was to remove Saddam’s regime in expectation of finding a link between WMD 
and Al-Qaeda. However, as the march to the war intensified the Bush administration 
became more aware of the advantage of spreading democracy in the Middle East, and 
Saddam’s removal and democratic reformation in Iraq would be ideal for the region and 
US interests. Like Robert Jervis (2003), Gause (2010) states that psychological factors 
after the 9/11 attacks, greatly influenced the decision-making process in US foreign 
policy towards Iraq. Bush administration officials strongly adhered to their convictions 
that Saddam was a terminal threat that must be destroyed. Bush and Cheney believed 
WMD existed in Iraq and that Saddam could use them against the US and therefore 
decision to go to war was out of sincere concern for the safety of the US. This belief 
22 
 
may be naïve in Gause’s opinion and should have warranted more reflection and 
verification; however this conviction justifies their action (Gause, III, 2010, p. 238-9). 
While Hinnebusch (2007) alleged that the neoconservatives were very persistent in 
implementing and expanding the US Empire strategy for its own self-interests. 
Nonetheless, Gause does not state the costly drawbacks of the US preemptive war in 
Iraq. Even if probabilities of terrorism were small, the costs of war were not redeemable 
and until today there is no effective exit strategy in place.    
These above-mentioned authors cover many aspects of Bush’s neoconservative 
agenda throughout his presidential era. Many scholars try to dissect the origin of the Iraq 
threat and its transformation into a Saddam threat. They emphasize the role of realism 
and idealism and how the former’s containment and deterrence strategy was weakened 
in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Ideology played a prominent role in Bush’s foreign 
strategy, especially in his first presidential term. The reasons for the US war on Iraq are 
still debated among political analysts. While these authors describe the decision-making 
process leading up to the US invasion in 2003, they also contribute perspectives in 
regards to what went wrong with Bush’s Iraq policy and how it eventually affected the 
US foreign policy of his successor that is examined in the next portion of this chapter. 
    
2.3 Obama’s ‘Right Over Might’ Policy in Syria:  
 The second part of this paper begins by discussing the build-up to Obama’s 
foreign policy towards the Middle East and Syria that initially started to develop in his 
first presidential election campaign in 2007. Obama was once criticized by Hillary 
Clinton, his rival during the 2008 Democratic Primaries, for his lack of experience in 
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dealing with dangerous regimes. Nonetheless, he gradually improved his foreign policy 
skills. Some contend that his strategy in Syria is inactive. Others argue the he is being 
reasonable in dealing with these problems from a distance because he is cautious of 
implementing ideology in his foreign policy, partially due to his successor’s failed 
extrinsic endeavor in the Middle East. There are also those who believe he is practicing 
idealism and soft-realism simultaneously. Some of the authors in this section date back 
to Bush’s presidency and US invasion of Iraq. It is important to review the ‘muscular’ 
Wilsonian agenda of Bush because of its substantial impact on Obama’s foreign policy 
in the Middle East. Articles that are studied in this section can help us understand the 
geopolitical structure of Syria in the Middle East region and how it affects Washington.  
 
2.3.1 Obama the ‘Hybrid’ President: 
In this part of the section Lizza and Mead discuss Obama’s reservations about 
adopting ideology and his preference for what may be described as a Jeffersonian soft-
realist tactic in protecting US strategic interests in the Middle East region.  
Ryan Lizza (2011) asserts that no president is either a realist or idealist since 
American values and interest are intertwined with each other. Obama’s reluctance to 
intervene in Syria is rooted in his conviction to steer the US away from the Middle East 
and diplomatically engage with nations across the Pacific. Nonetheless, American 
foreign policy has many interests at stake in the Middle East. And since the US invasion 
of Iraq and the Arab uprisings, the US seems unable but to get pulled back into the 
region’s conflicts whether for the protection of US interests or humanitarian 
commitments. Many considered Obama’s political platform as the antithesis of the Bush 
Doctrine. Lizza (2011) points out that Obama felt that he must essentially move away 
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from ideology after Bush’s “Freedom Agenda” had tainted US foreign policy in the 
Middle East. Obama’s critics and even those close to him feel the US, being a 
superpower, cannot lead from behind. It has to be assertive and powerful in its foreign 
policy strategies.  
Walter Russell Mead (2010) explains US foreign policy since the 1980s from 
four schools of thought which are: Alexander Hamilton, Woodrow Wilson, Thomas 
Jefferson and Andrew Jackson. He claims that Jeffersonians are often caught in a 
dichotomy between realism’s limited global policy based on economic advances and 
interests and Wilsonianism’s foreign policy of promoting democracy and humanitarian 
intervention. Jeffersonians are often criticized by many as being submissive. However, 
its preference for disarmament agreements and stability over unilateral decisions and 
military buildups has acted as a check against “imperial overstretch by ensuring that 
America’s ends are proportionate to its means” (Mead, 2010, para. 34). The Jeffersonian 
approach and its tenets can help us understand why Obama has chosen not to militarily 
intervene in Syria. The likes of President Jimmy Carter’s good-willed Jeffersonian 
approach that became plagued with failure in the 1980s mainly due to his tactic towards 
the Iranian Revolution must be dodged, especially in the present day after the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.       
2.3.2 US Policy Towards Syria from 2008-2009: 
Kaplan (2008) claimed that when Bashar al-Assad came into power problems 
were already present and he had not much choice but to suppress government criticism 
and protests. He suggested at one point (before the popular protests had erupted) for the 
establishment of a Syrian National Security Council to take on the role of an authorized 
judicial body that can oversee that change applies smoothly under unity. To a degree that 
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he almost romanticizes the notion that individuals from Syria’s ruling elite and the Baath 
regime will welcome pluralism and accountability while working with the opposition 
movements and the US (Kaplan, 2008). As Kaplan (2008) mentioned in his article, this 
scenario has taken place before and did not result in any success due to the regime’s 
brutal crackdown on ‘Damascus Spring’ forums and potential reform initiatives back in 
2000-2001. While it may be credible to posit that the secular nature of the Baath regime 
could be helpful in enabling democracy and maintaining sufficient coexistence among 
Syria’s divided society, Assad himself has undermined this attempt at reform by 
excluding all but a few close family members and allies in holding governmental and 
administrative positions.    
Mir H. Sadat and Daniel B. Jones (2009) are mentioned because their 
contributions help readers perceive how the relationship between the US and Syria has 
experienced variations in the recent past. The basis of their political engagement can be 
understood best by starting at the period described as the ‘Reign of the Realists’ when 
Ronald Reagan was US President in the 1980s. Sadat and Jones argue that even though 
Syria has been on the US State Department list of sponsors of terrorism since 1979, “it 
was realistic to overlook the authoritarian nature of the Syrian regime when it was the in 
U.S. national interest to seek its help” (Sadat & Jones, 2009, p. 95). The Bush 
administration’s approach towards their perceived idea of a rogue state, such as Syria, 
was “opposition through isolation” or as more convincingly coined by former US 
ambassador to the UAE, “isolation and monologue” (Sadat & Jones, 2009, p. 96). On the 
other hand, the US could have engaged Syria with dialogue and diplomacy instead of 
opting for the neocon’s exploitation of the democratic-peace theory. Sadat and Jones 
proposed for Obama’s administration to take a risk in supporting a moderate-realist 
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policy despite the fact that such a policy might pose a challenge to US national interests. 
In effect, this might encourage Syria to democratize or at least aid the US by allowing 
the Syrian regime to act as a mediator in the region. This kind of policy can also serve 
Syria by easing some of the sanctions against Assad’s regime and allowing the US to 
help Syria in securing its membership in the WTO (Sadat & Jones, 2009). 
2.3.3 US Policy Towards Syria from 2011-Present Day: 
Michael Singh (2011) contends that through US policy of encouraging reform 
and liberalization, the US administration should take on the responsibility of trying to 
establish stable alliances with the local populations and not just the authoritarian 
regimes. Singh (2011) acknowledges it was the US that planted the seeds of the current 
turmoil that eventually gave rise to anti-Americanism. Yet at the same time he agrees 
with Kenneth Wollack’s assertion that economic development and democratic 
governance have a great impact on each other. There are other examples of countries 
that have political repression, corruption and economic stagnation, and when these 
factors are all found in one place they tend to negatively influence and affect each other 
(Singh, 2011) In Syria, even when there was a shift to a neoliberal economy, 5% of the 
population owned the lucrative business ventures, while more than 30% were 
unemployed and between 11% and 30% were below the poverty level (Dahi & Munif, 
2012, p. 328). Singh (2011) suggests that the US must help expand political reform by 
advocating for political debate and discussion in its true form and by working hard in 
rolling back extremist groups that might try to take advantage of frail novel situations. 
Since democracy does not automatically solve corruption, the US must provide for 
technical and financial assistance so that Syria can build institutions that can give rise to 
and consolidate democracy. He also claims that the US should review its economic 
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approach towards the region and in a way this has already started, via the ‘Millennium 
Challenge Corporation’.     
Amos N. Guiora (2012) questions the principles and application of humanitarian 
and military intervention, since there is no international law with normative or 
architectural standard. He compares between the two distinct responses of the US 
administration regarding the conflicts in Libya and Syria. He claims that the US 
somehow vindicates its inaction in the Syrian conflict, because the Syrian opposition 
lacks organization like that of the Libyan protesters. Nonetheless, in 2011 the 
similarities of both conflicts far outweighed the differences. Guiora (2012) does make a 
valid point in that there are no clear criteria that justify intervention and it is not 
necessarily needed to influence foreign policy in the first place.  
One of the most interesting articles comparing the policies of the Bush and 
Obama administration and the impact of US foreign policy on the Arab Spring is ‘US 
Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests’ by Pierre M Atlas. 
He asserts that since America’s founding there has always been a struggle in US foreign 
policy between two diplomatic philosophies: realism and idealism. And as the promise 
of a prosperous Arab Spring spirals into a darker Arab winter, realism and idealism will 
shape, intertwine and occasionally clash with each other in US political discourse and 
policy. Atlas (2012) argues that Russia’s UN Security Council veto on condemning 
Bashar is due to Putin’s pure realist policy approach towards his ally Bashar Al-Assad. 
If the Syrian status quo remains the same that would be to Russia’s advantage, since the 
regime is a major consumer of Russian weaponry and the latter wants to retain its naval 
base in Tartus. Obama on the other hand is described as a “hybrid president” and a 
“progressive pragmatist” (Atlas, 2012, p. 360). Therefore the challenge of successful 
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statesmanship would require outlining the constituents of both power and morality and 
achieve a balance between them with continuous vigilance and calculation. Realism and 
idealism would be rooted in an Obama Doctrine that would act in opposite of the Bush 
Doctrine that empowered ‘muscular’ Wilsonianism together with neoconservative 
ideology. By adopting this approach, however, rarely would the Obama Doctrine apply 
to any Arab nation presently (with the exception of Libya) because its stipulations for 
authorizing US humanitarian military intervention are too demanding. However, 
Obama’s inconsistent and soft-realist policy in the Middle East can hardly be described 
as a doctrine. Nonetheless, having a doctrine may not be as imperative as having a well-
balanced assertive policy.  
The authors of ‘Beyond The Arab Spring: Authoritarianism & Democratization 
in the Arab World’ Brynen et al. (2012), mention that after the US invaded Iraq and 
condemned the Syrian regime (the US had supported and signed UN Security Council 
Resolution 1559), Assad severely tightened the noose of government control in 
anticipation of a possible US military intervention to follow as it had in Iraq. Between 
the clamp downs on Damascus Spring initiatives and forums, Bashar pursued greater 
control measures replacing old-guard officials of the Baath regime with close family 
members and allies (Brynen et al, 2012, p. 42-43). Bashar’s political and military 
appointees, including the governing elites, took control of old and new economic 
monopolies and this added to the frustration of the exhausted Syrian public, particularly 
in the wake of the uprisings that had already begun in Tunisia and Egypt. According to 
Hinnebusch (2007), the Syrian president wanted to distance himself from his father’s 
Baath regime in order to demonstrate to the US the regime’s gradual attempts at reform. 
He gradually introduced economic reform in a substantive manner, such as privatization 
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of specific divisions and foreign investment opportunities (Brynen et al., 2012, p. 44). 
Dahi and Munif (2012) would argue that economic liberalization did take place in a 
subtle qualitative manner instead of being a quantitative change that hardly made any 
substantive progress in the lives of the rest of Syria’s population. Assad’s regime no 
longer showed signs of tolerating political reform, however, and they arrested and 
punished the last remnant of the Damascus Spring.      
Omar S. Dahi and Yasser Munif (2012), claim that the development of liberal 
democracies in the West is because they were able to export their surplus of violence to 
the Arab societies during the colonial era. In effect, those on the receiving end are not 
just revolting against their authoritarian regimes but also against Western dependency. 
Although this argument is rather general in its explanation, they further contend that 
authoritarian regimes have accepted Western dissemination of violence in exchange for 
Western tolerance to their autocratic rule and maintenance of US interests in the region. 
(Dahi & Munif, 2012).  
Paul R. Williams and Colleen (Betsey) Popken (2012) review ten short-term 
observations about the Arab Spring. They believe that US response and support of 
democratic movements, rests on the foreseeable fall of the ruler, yet cautions that 
Washington might fall back on the traditional approach of depending on non-democratic 
leaders or groups. They also discuss the norm ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) adopted 
by the UN Security Council and its development. The use of R2P is inconsistent as we 
have witnessed its effectiveness in Libya but it has yet to be authorized or applied in 
Syria (Williams & Popken, 2012). Many have argued that ‘R2P’ cannot be effective 
without the approval of the major regional players including the Arab league especially 
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since the latter gained prominence in the approach to Libya’s struggle. The need for 
‘widespread consent’ weakens the fundamental purpose of R2P.  
Ved P. Nanda (2012) contrasts the US policy of military intervention in Libya 
and the non-military intervention policy in Syria by also referring to the UN 
“Responsibility to Protect” norm based on a three-pillar framework for its effectiveness. 
The problem with R2P is that it lacks the necessary tools that are essential for its proper 
implementation in cases of prevention or coercion. Its lack of chronological order of the 
stipulated features is a weakness that allows for its inconsistent use that makes nations 
suspicious of its provision and use of force. Nanda asserts that the BRIC countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India and China) cannot agree with the rest of the West on the 
application of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P), regardless of the first two frameworks 
of this humanitarian intervention doctrine being associated with preventive actions. The 
third pillar of R2P, “timely and decisive response by the international community to 
prevent and halt atrocity crimes” (Nanda, 2012, p. 22), needs a fundamental monitoring 
and assessment system, in anticipation of its measures far outweighing the mandate 
granted by the Security Council for the use of force.  
Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Ray Takeyh discuss how Qaddafi’s regime had 
transformed from a recognized international renegade and sponsor of terrorism into what 
US ambassador Gene Cretz had described, a “strategic ally” of the US, since its 
cooperation on matters of nonproliferation and counterterrorism (Gvosdev & Takeyh, 
2012, p. 8). However, on March 11, 2011 there was a shift in US policy that became 
evident when ‘Operation Odyssey Dawn’ went into effect against Qaddafi and his 
government. Gvosdev and Takeyh (2012) question if America’s foreign policy has 
entered a post-realist phase where promotion of US democratic values, at minimal costs, 
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precedes its national interests. “The Arab Spring could offer the United States a template 
for future limited interventions that could uphold American values without exacting 
much cost in return” (Gvosdev & Takyeh, 2012, p. 17). It seems US policy makers today 
are more willing to pursue small-scale military interventions instead of large-scale 
operations, and while the results may not be optimal they are nonetheless satisfactory. 
US foreign policy has deescalated since the time of George W. Bush’s legacy of being 
an ideology strategist that favors big-stick diplomacy. Obama has sided with soft-
realism in his US foreign policy approach although an intervention similar to Libya’s 
has yet to occur anywhere else. It seems Obama’s administration prefers the current 
balance-of-power in the Middle East, since interests might be lost and costs might 
exceedingly increase in the chaotic and ambiguous environment of the region.   
David S. Sorenson (2013) warns of a complex and dangerous problem if the 
Syrian civil war were to spill over across its borders into neighboring states. America 
has too many interests at stake in the Middle East and Syria seems to be at the center of 
it all due to its shared porous borders with US allies. Like Fawcett (2013), Sorenson 
(2013) claims that the heart of the war is the conflict that is escalating between the 
Sunnis and Shiites throughout the region. Sorenson stresses that in this current volatile 
situation the only approach the US can adopt is containment. The US is stuck in a game 
of chicken with Syria. It cannot control or restrict the actions of the Syrian regime. 
Sorenson asserts that Al-Qaeda or its associated groups (e.g. ISIS) have a high chance of 
being the true beneficiaries after Assad is gone (Sorenson, 2013). Consequently, the US 
cannot do much except contain the problem within Syria’s borders. The primary players 
in the conflict in Syria, whether it’s the Syrian regime or violent extremists, will be 
hostile towards US interests and its Middle East regional allies.    
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Former Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger (2012) claims that US foreign 
policy should not be blamed for havoc in the Middle East region, nor can it solve all the 
shortcomings in domestic issues and policies of nations in the area. His assertion holds 
true to a certain point but fails to account for the meddling perpetrated by the US in the 
internal affairs of some Middle East nations trying to nationalize their resources or 
undergo some form of democracy. Kissinger (2012) attributes that the real fight within 
Syria, is not so much for democracy as much as it is a political conflict between Assad’s 
Alawites that is also supported by other Syrian minorities, and the Sunni majority. 
Washington is encountering a choice between strategy and governance. In effect, the 
political actors within the Middle East region that are willing to take part of a new world 
order along with the West must understand that US contribution must be calculated and 
met by their compatibility with American interests and values. Thus we must mesh 
realism and idealism together instead of placing them at opposite ends (Kissinger, 2012). 
 
2.4 Conclusion: 
This chapter examines how the efforts of Bush and Obama to deal with rogue 
regimes have differed. Bush sought to change the ideological structure of these regimes 
into democracies through extrinsic military intervention. Obama, on the other hand, 
chose to reduce US military force abroad and focus on US domestic issues while 
encouraging democracy by setting an exceptional example at home. Obama also stresses 
that reform should be encouraged and developed through intrinsic public movements. 
The Bush administration decided to engage in war without thoroughly examining 
evidence and possible outcomes first. The Obama administration believes that there 
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should be more substantial evidence, an evaluation of interests to consider, and robust 
multilateral consensus before US military involvement. The next two chapters will 
explore in further detail the comprehensive studies and comparative analysis that the 
mentioned authors have laid out, starting with the role of ideology in Bush’s foreign 
policy in the lead-up to and during Iraq’s war and followed by an examination of 
Obama’s soft-realist policy in Syria. 
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Chapter Three 
 
The Era of Bush’s Doctrine and the US Invasion of 
Iraq 
3.1 Introduction: 
Robert L. Jervis (2003) asserts that US foreign policy during George W. Bush’s 
era in the Middle East can best be explained as “offensive realism”, because states 
always have the desire for power, therefore they will try to develop more security in an 
uncertain future. In political analysis the fundamental distinction is between coercion 
and brute force, each of which is further divided into two branches. Compellence and 
deterrence are under coercion and offense and defense are categorized within brute 
force. The Bush policy towards Iraq in colloquial terms is regularly described as 
coercive, but this is not accurate in the political sense. Jervis is correct when he claims 
that Bush felt that the only effective way to deal with Saddam Hussein is through brute 
force. This means “the ability of a state to take and hold what is wants by physically 
defeating the other’s army” (Jervis, 2003, p. 320).         
Jervis (2003) and Gause (2010) make the same point that psychology has played 
an important factor in the decision to invade Iraq. Inaction can lead to more danger. The 
possibility of uncertainty must be eliminated by taking the lead with preemptive war. 
Gause (2010) asserts that psychology enmeshed with foreign policy can help us 
comprehend why the Bush administration was determined to invade Iraq after 9/11. 
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When analysts were not able to locate any substantial WMD in Iraq, the US 
administration was quick to defend its position by referring to the period of the First 
Gulf War and cite Iraq’s previously declared stockpiles of dangerous arms and its 
previous use of chemical weapons as evidence that WMD must exist but are concealed. 
The previous existence of WMD does not in fact provide evidence they continued to 
exist but psychological factors made this deduction seem plausible in the eyes of the 
administration. Information that would support their premise of Iraq’s WMD was highly 
valued while evidence that contradicted their assertions was disregarded. Optimism 
about post-war Iraq’s venture towards democracy flourished and now there was no 
going back to ‘deterrence’ partly because the Bush administration believed it was a 
failure in the 1990-1991 Gulf War period (Gause, 2010). Those who supported the 
invasion of Iraq were propelled to argue that a war against an authoritarian like Saddam 
Hussein with WMD was not going to be inexpensive, however costs would be minimal 
and the outcome would be successful. They contended that the long-term prospect of 
deterrence is dangerous and an uncomplicated military victory is highly conceivable; 
there would also be positive regional feedback after Saddam’s ouster and Iraq’s nation 
building towards democracy and stability would look ideal. Jervis argues that a 
psychological explanation can help us comprehend the neoconservative’s perceptions of 
Saddam’s removal since these four factors mentioned above are being linked together as 
multiple facets of one outcome when in fact they are independent of each other (Jervis, 
2003, p. 318).  
This chapter is about the role of ideology in Bush’s foreign policy towards Iraq. 
‘Regime change hawks’ demoted realism’s containment and deterrence strategy and  
unilaterally adopted preemptive action and the use of military force in the Middle East to 
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halt terrorism and roll back rogue regimes. The neoconservatives’ goals to implant 
democracy in Iraq and verify the bandwagoning theory in the Middle East ultimately 
proved to be unsuccessful.  Chapter three is divided into six parts. The first section 
discusses the heated debate between the neoconservatives and the realists regarding 
Bush’s strategy in the lead-up to Iraq’s war in 2003, the second segment is about the rise 
of Saddam Hussein as a threat, followed by a discussion concerning the aftermath of US 
invasion of Iraq. The fourth part questions the neoconservatives’ motivations behind 
Iraq’s war, the fifth portion examines the impact of Iraq’s war on the Arab Spring and 
this chapter ends with a conclusion that summarizes all the pertinent points and views.    
 
3.2 Neoconservatives versus Realists: 
In the lead-up to the war, the realists and neo-conservatives argued whether or 
not the US should wage a war against Saddam’s regime. The neocons believed in big-
stick diplomacy. The Bush doctrine claimed that military power will yield much more 
effective results than diplomacy, which in effect facilitates unilateral decisions. Iranians, 
North Koreans, Palestinians and Syrians would be threatened by the US military show of 
force, surrender and jump on the US bandwagon, ultimately proving the “domino 
theory”. Mearsheimer (2005), underlines in his argument that in order to better perceive 
the neoconservative aspect concerning Iraq’s invasion, we must comprehend their 
“bandwagoning” logic. In the lead-up to the war, the neoconservatives argued that the 
“domino theory” effect can help create friendly democracies and render states with 
democratic values and policies. The neocons also believed in the democratic-peace 
theory. Since democracies tend to associate with each other with peaceful and benign 
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intentions; it was a war where the “white hats” would militarily defeat and roll back the 
nefarious “black hats” in order to spread democracy. In effect, this would reproduce 
more white hats, because democracies ensure security and stability and rarely fight with 
each other (Mearsheimer, 2005, p. 9).   
The Bush’s administration faith in the ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA), 
made them believe that their theory would be efficient and effective in a relatively short 
amount of time. RMA would include, “stealth technology, air-delivered precision-
guided weapons, and small but highly mobile ground forces to win quick and decisive 
victories” (Mearsheimer, 2005, p. 2). The idea of a larger army or big battalions would 
work against RMA which would undermine the unilateralist decision to invade Iraq. 
Mearsheimer (2005) argues that RMA is incompetent in fighting back an insurgency and 
the US does not have much success in nation-building especially in a region with barely 
any experience in democracy. The neocons had wishful thoughts that once they endowed 
a troublesome nation like Iraq with their idealism of democracy (deriving from the 
paradigm of neo-conservatism, underlying the foreign strategy of the Bush 
administration), the rest of the Middle East and Islamic world would follow, hence the 
domino theory would become operative. Although there would be some bumps ahead, 
the end of the road would look bright. The irony was that Bush and previous US 
presidents did not have a problem with other Middle East authoritarian regimes that 
acted in complete contrast to their democratic values as long as they served US strategic 
interests.  
In the 1980s, the US had provided Saddam with overhead satellite imagery to 
strike the Iranian army. This is just one example of the US exerting foreign policy based 
on classical realism. Interestingly, Mearsheimer (2005) argues how the father of 
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classical realism, Hans Morgenthau would have opposed the US war on Iraq, since the 
large-scale military venture in Vietnam was unsuccessful and burdensome for the US 
and Vietnam. He would have not at all been optimistic about the Bush Doctrine. What 
makes it more credible in a multiethnic and sectarian-divided nation like Iraq located in 
a volatile region that barely had any experience in democracy? In short, realists believe 
that we live in a world where states resist threat through balancing behavior rather than 
bandwagon: and “when one state puts its fist in another state’s face, the target usually 
does not throw its hands in the air and surrender” (Mearsheimer, 2005, p. 4). Moreover, 
the most powerful political ideology is nationalism, not democracy. The Vietnamese did 
not fight for US idealism or communism rather for self-determination and nationalism. 
The Iraqi people had suffered under the hands of their despot and they to some degree 
needed help (at least in weakening Saddam’s regime which would help recruit and 
empower Iraqi democratic opposition groups) but so did other countries that encountered 
the same kind of atrocities by their leaders, if not worse. Nonetheless, this war was 
initiated first and foremost for US security and self-interests and not for humanitarian 
intervention purposes. When bandwagoning becomes ineffective - because the US is 
heavily embroiled with insurgencies and an ill-prepared nation-building dilemma after 
the war - America’s remaining adversaries presumed to become fearful of the US would 
nonetheless become more resilient and enhance their nuclear deterrents. Many Iraqis 
wanted Saddam out, but it did not necessarily mean foreign intervention at the expense 
of thousands of innocent lives. Iraq’s war did somehow have an impact on the ‘Arab 
Spring’ movement that started in Tunis but the countries and groups that are hostile to 
the US did not react by immediately jumping on the US ‘bandwagon’, instead it made 
them prone to more animosity against Western intervention, and triggered nefarious 
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factions to grow and spread terrorism regionally. The next section looks at how Saddam 
Hussein became a menacing problem for Washington since the 1990s. The terrorist 
attacks and the substantial events that followed 9/11 supported the idea of Saddam’s 
removal to finally materialize and develop into the ideological foreign policy of the 
Bush administration towards Iraq.  
 
3.3 The Rise of the ‘Saddam Threat’:  
Russell A. Burgos (2008) argues that the reformulation of American foreign 
policy that led to Iraq’s invasion in 2003 had already started in the 1990s and not 
immediately after 9/11. In 1998, the Iraq problem was redefined as the “Saddam 
Problem” and regime change was seen as the most effective policy option by “second-
level official(s) of sub-cabinet rank” (Burgos, 2008, p. 222) who would eventually play 
a critical role throughout the decision-making process of Iraq’s war. Michael J. Mazarr 
had described 9/11 as a “policy window-a crisis event that enabled decision makers to 
switch policy tracks at very low cost” (Burgos, 2008, p. 224-5). According to Burgos 
(2008) the decision to go to war after the attacks was the culmination of a policy process 
that had started long before. The choice to go Iraq and depose Saddam Hussein was a 
preferred plan of action among major players in US foreign policy prior to George W. 
Bush becoming president. 
  The September 11 attacks had three major consequences with regards to 
influencing US foreign policy in the lead-up to Iraq’s war. Military use would become 
less costly since it would be used as an effective tool in the US “Global War on Terror”; 
The modest cost and initial success of the war in Afghanistan made the prospects of 
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Iraq’s war optimistic; and finally, Republican majority in congress and an increase in 
public support of President Bush also paved the way for the regime change hawk’s 
decision to go to war. One scholar described the public debate of Iraq policy “a 
conspiracy of ideas (and) not individuals that led to the war” (Burgos, 2008, p. 226). 
Burgos (2008) gives alternative explanations for Iraqi regime change that political 
scholars have studied to help us understand US grand strategy in Iraq. Among these 
accounts were cognitive explanations that Gause and Jervis had also discussed as 
psychological explanations, which analyze “cognitive origins of foreign policy look at 
decision makers’ biases, uses of analogies, heuristics or schemas or operations codes” 
(Burgos, 2008, p. 229). According to Burgos (2008), Bush can be described as a 
president who needed to appear resolute to the point of stubbornness; a born-again 
Christian whose decision was also driven by faith and instinct. He publicly loathed 
Saddam for trying to assassinate his father back in Kuwait in 1993. However, this 
alternative can only explain an individual’s impact on the decision-making process 
instead of making an idea-centered analysis, where Saddam’s removal was embedded in 
American foreign policy discourse long before.    
The hardline neoconservatives and hawkish political officials that were in 
Washington throughout Bill Clinton’s presidential era contended that containment and 
controlling Saddam in a “strategic box” severely lost its credibility and only his forceful 
removal from power would solve the “Iraq problem”. By 1998, regime change hawks 
such as Richard Perle were convinced that containment was “bound to fail” against the 
backdrop of realists “fixation and obsession with stability” (Burgos, 2008, p. 239). By 
1998, regime change had won over public debate, since the containment status quo was 
starting to empirically prove itself as unproductive. This drawback was even recognized 
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by a few Clinton administration proponents. The often labelled “Wolfowitz Plan” 
endorsed by neoconservatives included US support of exiled-Iraqis “democratic 
opposition movement”. Its aim was to overthrow Saddam and the rest of the 
developments would follow.  
Influential political rhetoric adopted by ideologues of regime change through 
ideational and institutional constitutions redirected US policy to an unsurmountable war. 
A major problem of the US’s strategy of Iraq’s invasion was that it was planned 
halfway, when there should have been a full-scale plan for government replacement and 
a counter strategy to stop insurgencies.   
The neocons and realists were practically always in a heated debate over whether 
or not it was in America’s interest to invade Iraq. The realists were eventually pushed 
aside and the conceptual framework and neoconservative vision of American foreign 
policy developed the ‘Bush Doctrine’. This ultimately boosted the decision to invade 
Iraq and topple its leader in 2003. The neocons severely criticized realism’s balance-of-
power and instead inflated their own theory of bandwagoning. Brian C. Schmidt and 
Michael C. Williams (2008) claim that after the first Persian Gulf War from 1990-1991, 
the neoconservatives were unhappy with the outcome. They wanted the US 
administration to go all the way to Baghdad and remove Saddam from power. They 
sought to endorse a grand strategy that would “prevent the emergence of a new rival” 
(Schmidt & Williams, 2008, p. 195). This plan was outlined in March 1992 in a secret 
five-year Defense Planning Guidance paper that was leaked to the press. Paul 
Wolfowitz, the undersecretary of defense for policy from 1989-1993, was the principal 
author of the paper. The neocons had a significant preference for a hegemonic order over 
realism’s balance-of-power order. This was also obvious in the graduation speech at 
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West Point in June 2002, when Bush stated that, “America has, and intends to keep 
military strengths beyond challenge-thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other 
eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace” (Schmidt & 
Williams, 2008, p. 195). This kind of attitude would profoundly differ from President 
Obama’s speech about multilateral action and non-interventionist US foreign policy, at 
the West Point graduation ceremony in 2014 when he stated, “America must always lead 
on the world stage. If we don’t, no one else will. The military that you have joined is, 
and always will be, the backbone of that leadership. But U.S. military action cannot be 
the only-or even primary-component of our leadership in every instance. Just because 
we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail. And because the 
costs associated with military action are so high, you should expect every civilian leader 
– and especially your Commander-in-Chief – to be clear about how that awesome power 
should be used” (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2014, para. 15). 
The neoconservatives perceived a return to a multipolar balance-of-power as a 
hindrance to American national interests and a threat to its security and the international 
order. Four elements underlined the Bush Doctrine and delivered an influential rationale 
for invading Iraq. These were: bandwagoning; when given the opportunity for 
democratization from the US, all the people will aspire to and eventually support 
democracy. The most controversial element of the Bush Doctrine was the policy of 
preemption through the use of military force. Deterrence was assumed to be 
counterproductive against rogue states, because neoconservatives became unwavering in 
their opinion that terrorists were more than willing to die for their cause. Unilateralism 
dominated US foreign policy and the principal of preemption was what assured 
neoconservatives that they can maintain a unipolar international system. Bush’s 
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inclination to a unilateralist behavior was already present before 9/11 when it vetoed the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), the Kyoto Protocol and other international 
agreements. Most importantly, its invasion of Iraq was a unilateralist action when it 
overrode the UN Security Council in regards to the UN’s disagreement about the 2003 
US invasion of Iraq. Finally, the promotion of democracy what Mearsheimer refers to as 
“Wilsonianism with teeth” (Schmidt & Williams, 2008, p. 199). Neoconservatives were 
believed to be the respective heirs of Wilsonian liberalism that should often be instigated 
by force.  
Realists have always been critical of US attempts to employ moralistic foreign 
policy crusades, in order to transform nations into what is sees best. Classical realist 
Hans J. Morgenthau would try endlessly to convince American foreign policy officials 
of the dangers in pursuing foreign policies based on universal moral principles and 
values, while backhanding national interests if not neglecting them altogether. Realism 
also underscored the significance of moral and political values however to a certain 
subtle degree. Classical realist Hans J. Morgenthau emphasized that moral principles 
should develop from political reality. To pursue a policy of universal democracy would 
lead to disaster because in the end “commitments would out run resources and failure 
would ensue” (Schmidt & Williams, 2008, p. 203). This would become the case with the 
Bush Doctrine. Bandwagoning in the Middle East was ineffective because states, even 
weaker ones, do not easily give up their rights in a self-help anarchical system. Realism 
does not divorce itself from political reality. It even provided a preconceived warning 
about urban warfare particularly in nations with multiethnic diversity. The Bush 
administration advocated that the spread of democracy was the antidote to all of 
terrorism and ills emanating from the Middle East.  
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Robert A. Pape argues that Bush’s strategy of unilateralism and hardline foreign 
policy has done away with the US reputation for endurable benign intentions and in 
response has compelled other states to adopt “soft balancing measures” (Schmidt & 
Williams, 2008, p. 206-7). Major rival powers have become more vigilant of 
Washington’s unchecked authority and this was exemplified recently when Russia and 
China placed a veto on UN sanctions against the Syrian regime. This responsive 
behavior includes actions that do not directly challenge US military superiority, they 
instead utilize nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine US unilateral military 
interventions. Realists such as Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer believed that 
Saddam could have been deterred and contained even if Iraq developed a nuclear 
arsenal. His record has shown that he was not worse than Egyptian and Israeli leaders 
when they initiated several wars since 1948 (Schmidt & Williams, 2008, p. 207-208). 
Saddam knew that he would not and could use WMD against the US since the retaliation 
would be immeasurable and catastrophic. 
Public interests affect national interests and vice versa. The culture and values of 
domestic politics has an impact on national interests which shapes the development of 
foreign policy. Neoconservatives were able to win the debate over Iraq’s invasion, 
because realism failed to generate commitment and resources in public political debate 
to secure its success. It generally suffers the fate of modern rationalism. The neocons 
proudly portray their policy as speaking on behalf of US national interest, proclaiming 
themselves as the advocates of authentic American culture and values who were derided 
and mocked by liberals and realists. If realists want to become more successful in 
political debates they must enlighten their policy preferences from a ‘realpolitik’ aspect; 
“realists need to be much more explicit about the values that underlie their favored 
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policy prescriptions and more expansive in their social and political analysis” (Schmidt 
& Williams, 2008, p. 220). The next part discusses the weaknesses of Bush’s foreign 
policy in failing to assess the realistic elements that should have been accounted for and 
remedied, especially in the wake of Saddam’s removal.   
 
3.4 What Went Wrong After Saddam’s Downfall?  
As has become apparent in the discussion above, the US invasion of Iraq back in 
2003 was aided by neoconservatives using influential political rhetoric stemming from 
concepts of liberalism and idealism (the neoconservative derivation of that term). 
Unfortunately, the US either underestimated the value of or refrained from using 
liberalism’s key instrument, international institutions, a fundamental element that 
promotes democracy. Politicians such as former National Security Advisor, Condoleezza 
Rice, and former US Senator at the time, John Kerry, would go on to allege that it was 
an amalgamation of Wilsonian liberal theory and pragmatic realism that drove the war in 
Iraq (Snyder, 2004). Countries with weak political institutions when trying to evolve 
into democracies are more likely to enter (civil) wars as we are witnessing today in the 
MENA region to varying degrees. Jack Snyder (2004) gives prominent examples of 
nations that have suffered following experiences with mass electoral democracy, such as 
Ethiopia, Russia, and Armenia just to name a few. Further justifying this concept when 
weak political institutions are concerned, Iraq is yet again experiencing democracy 
failures. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki failed to produce a representative 
government and marginalized the rights of other Iraqi factions, including the Sunnis. 
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Now that he has stepped down in August 2014, he was replaced with a new incumbent 
PM, Haider al-Abadi.   
Snyder (2004) asserts that disorder in these situations is partly due to the desire 
for self-determination. When that is ignored in evolving democracies, hostility arising 
from the indigenous people is redirected against the democratic allies of oppressive 
regimes. This was the case of many people in the Arab world regarding their disdain of 
the US government. According to Snyder, while the Bush administration tried to 
promote the advantages of liberal democracies it marginalized international institutions, 
liberalism’s major contributor in international relations. G. John Ikenberry claimed that 
if international constitutional order were to become successful there should be legalism 
and transparency. Even though international institutions cannot restrain hegemonic 
powerful interests, it can provide long-term mutual interests that are guaranteed for both 
the weak states and the hegemon (Snyder, 2004, p. 58-59).   
 The Bush administration was so determined to start a war that they overlooked 
the second most critical phase, the aftermath of the war when Saddam was removed 
from power over a relatively short time span. They failed to anticipate or adequately 
prepare for dangerous scenarios and insurgencies, which led them to become careless in 
planning and implementing democracy and its principles that must be channeled through 
international institutions. The West cannot anticipate democracy to be a smooth 
transition in a country ruled by a despot for almost twenty-one years. The US cannot 
expect these nations to successfully implement change by simply mimicking the tenets 
of Western democracy. Idealism works for Western democracies but, as the name 
implies, it works best as an ideal especially for nations with the same collective values, 
culture, and social concepts that are established and developed within nations. Snyder 
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correctly observes that: “Idealism stresses that a consensus on values must underpin any 
stable political order, yet it also recognizes that forging such a consensus often requires 
an ideological struggle with the potential for conflict” (Snyder, 2004, p. 55).  There was 
no consensus on values and ideas in the first place in Iraq, so one has to take that into 
serious consideration from the outset and be prepared for the worst in a divided society 
that suffers from tensions between religious and ethnic clusters. These social groups had 
very little respect for Western values, including democracy, or were influenced to view 
them with disdain.  
We can witness frustration in Iraq today with the struggle between the Sunnis 
and the Shiites. It has also shifted and spread across Iraq’s borders, with the rise of ISIS 
in Iraq and Syria and their continued efforts to permeate to other neighboring countries. 
Snyder argues that the collective ideas and values of idealism might be harmonious but 
do not necessarily resolve all of human rights abuses. What is fundamentally missing is 
a tangible agent of democratic transition and moderation, i.e. liberalism’s institutions. 
This weakness in idealism reflected negatively on US foreign policy in Iraq. Planned 
democratic change is best implemented through these valuable and effective institutions. 
The next portion of this chapter examines the material (oil) and ideological motives 
regarding the Bush administration’s military intervention in Iraq which have taken a 
prominent role in various political debates and analysis.  
 
3.5 Did the US Invade Iraq for Democracy or Oil?  
Raymond Hinnebusch (2007) is in search of an explanation for why the Bush 
administration chose to invade Iraq since Saddam did not pose a substantial threat 
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against the US. Failure to remove Saddam from power would have constrained US 
freedom of action in the Middle East to some degree or may have posed a menace to 
Israel. In 2003, Washington and the majority of the media were swayed by the 
extremist/militarist wing of the Israeli lobby active in Washington (the pro-Likud 
neocons, such as Paul Wolfowitz) and the arms/oil lobbies (comprised of VP Dick 
Cheney and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld) who supported the ‘Greater 
Israel’ project. Nonetheless, mainstream International Relations theories seem to be 
weak in providing rationales for the war in Iraq. Hinnebusch (2007) believes realism has 
failed in delivering a valid account and that interests and ideology in concert with each 
other pushed for the war. He argues that Iraq’s oil is the obvious materialist explanation 
for war and the desire for the US to dominate the oil market. While oil and Israel play a 
pivotal role in US hegemony, Hinnebusch (2007) claims that there were three more 
factors that influenced the Bush doctrine: The first pertained to a US grand strategy of 
global hegemony through unilateralism and coercive action; military capabilities over 
negotiations and deterrence. A shift in the US strategic position in the Middle East after 
9/11 is the second component. Hegemony for oil became the target due to US oil 
vulnerability, the weakening of the ‘Pax Americana’ and a shaky relationship with Saudi 
Arabia. While the neocons were in power there was an opportunity for the US to 
strategically engage with military hegemony which would be an advantageous option for 
itself and Israel, as an alternative to balancing power in the region. The third swaying 
element, the class interests of the Bush’s ruling coalition would be transferred to regime 
interests, specifically the oil-arms-construction complex. A war would raise oil prices, 
oil company shares and invite more arms spending. Hinnebusch (2007) argues that we 
should reevaluate the theories of ‘hegemonic stability’ (HST), because the Iraq war has 
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weakened its persuasiveness. With Iraq’s war, the US has moved from being a benign 
hegemony and from playing the role of a balancer and led to empowering the idea of US 
Empire in political deliberations. Hence the Iraq war has proven that strategic territories 
remain indispensable, despite what globalization theorists assert that it entails 
“burdensome responsibilities”. Nonetheless acquisition of territory might be to the 
benefit of gaining resourceful interests, such as the ‘swimming in oil’ logic.  
(Hinnebusch, 2007, p. 214-15). He claims that a different administration would have not 
invaded Iraq but rather revived the Israeli-Palestinian peace process or attuned its dual 
containment policy against Saddam. In present day, we can observe the return of an 
adjusted containment policy in reference to Obama’s somewhat inactive policy 
concerning Syria’s conflict and US limited action against ISIS. 
On the other hand, Gause (2010) counters the hypothesis that the US invaded 
Iraq in order to secure oil resources. He argues that President Bush did display some 
ambiguity about his strategy concerning Saddam. He had supported the ‘1998 Liberation 
Act’ and throughout his presidential campaign he also advocated for tougher sanctions 
and a forceful containment policy against Iraq’s regime. When asked in an interview 
how he would react if he found out Saddam possessed WMD, his response was he 
would take “them” (the weapons) out. Even though the Bush administration did include 
proponents of military hardliners that urged for Saddam’s removal, they did not 
completely influence Bush’s opinion and policy until after 9/11. In the first month of 
Bush’s tenure, the President opted for former Secretary of State Collin Powell’s option 
to authorize more sanctions against Saddam that would put excessive pressure on him. 
Prior to the terrorist attacks, “smart sanctions” – modified sanctions against the regime 
that comprised of subtle diplomacy and a multilateral course – were put to the test by the 
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Bush administration. This proposal was not met with much enthusiasm internationally 
and eventually dwindled by summer 2001. Key players in the Bush administration such 
as Cheney and Rice and including the president himself started to treat even one percent 
doubt of WMD as a dangerous imminent threat. Saddam with a possible connection to 
al-Qaeda, speculations of WMD and a hostile history towards the US and its regional 
allies would have to be removed and punished immediately.    
Did promotion of democracy become US policy in Iraq to serve as a justification 
for the invasion after no WMD were found? Gause (2010) refutes this argument. For the 
Bush administration democracy promotion since the lead-up to and throughout Iraq’s 
invasion played an ancillary role to Saddam’s WMD-terrorist nexus. The neocons 
claimed that a democratic Iraq would produce a wide-range of benefits for the region 
and the world. Iraq would serve as a democratic template for the liberation of other 
nations in the Middle East. Gause’s argument seems to be weak in this aspect. How can 
there be democracy for some antagonistic part of the Middle East while undemocratic 
regimes such as Saudi Arabic and Egypt (under Hosni Mubarak’s rule) remain in power 
without objections? Democracy promotion only plays a vital function when US security 
and interests are threatened and deemed to be in danger.  
Was US military intervention in Iraq motivated by its desire to control Iraq’s oil 
fields? The Gulf’s oil has for some time been of strategic importance to the US and 
greatly affects American foreign policy. However, according to Gause (2010) the oil 
logic did not drive the US to a preemptive war in 2003. US oil companies were 
eventually established in Iraq after Bush had already completed his two presidential 
terms. However, when Bush was still president, American companies were not in a 
hurry to sign contracts for the development of new Iraqi oil fields. Only one major 
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contract was signed by the end of 2008 with a Chinese company (excluding oil deals in 
Iraqi Kurdistan with Turkish and Swedish energy firms). If Bush’s strategy did consist 
of oil dominance it was negligent in its goal of securing a place for US energy and oil 
companies in post-war Iraq. And as for allegations of the US wanting to break ties with 
OPEC and weaken that group’s position in the oil market, this did not take place either 
and Iraq did willingly resume its membership with OPEC once sovereignty was restored 
(Gause, 2010, p. 233-38). Therefore, there is not enough evidence about post-war oil 
planning in Iraq in the pre-war decision process to strengthen the argument that it was a 
war for oil.      
 
3.6 The Effect of Iraq’s War on the Arab Spring: 
Louise Fawcett (2013) claims that Iraq’s war has an important impact and 
continuity at a state, regional and international level that can allow us to assess the Arab 
uprisings and its future implications. At a state level, the protracted civil war in Iraq 
prompted fear in the authoritarian regimes throughout the region which led to brutal 
crackdowns on government opposition groups and emerging radical Islamic movements. 
Authoritarian regimes reserved experiments in political liberalization. This in turn 
motivated and pushed for mass social mobilization to demand democracy and regime 
change. At the international level, the current US administration prefers lower-profile 
regional engagement and multilateral action over unilateralism. The war also further 
pushed powerful rival states to underscore their power at a global level. However 
Fawcett (2013) reminds us, that Russia has essential economic and military links with its 
ally, Syria. Therefore it needs to retain the regional status quo even if weakened and 
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constrained. It’s realism at its best, in Russia’s foreign policy towards Syria. The Iraq 
war did eventually open up pathways for political change at the state level, however the 
Arab uprisings were internal and “national” bottom-up movements, while Iraq’s war was 
an external intervention instigated and implemented by Bush and his team of 
neoconservatives. Maybe if the US had not intervened in Iraq, the Iraqi people 
themselves, influenced by the Arab Spring movements, would have protested for 
Saddam’s ousting and democracy. Tunis has played a more inspirational role in being 
the first nation to call out for change and democracy and set the stage for a domino 
effect of Arab Spring revolutions. Even the authors of ‘Beyond the Arab Spring’ claim 
that the determination of the Syrian people to protest and fight for change was largely 
affected by the internal coup of the Tunisian and Egyptian dictatorship regimes (Brynen 
et al. 2012, p. 46).  The Iraq experience consequently led the public mass of other 
nations to become more guarded against US intervention. Western hubris contends that 
events in the Middle East are greatly affected by Western activity. However even if 
democracy is achieved and core Western interests are guaranteed to be secured, it will 
arrive on its own course. In the volatile and dynamic Middle East region, that is 
currently experiencing mayhem and a shift at a state and regional level, there will be 
“drift from dependence to greater autonomy-facilitated by domestic changes and a wider 
menu of international choices” (Fawcett, 2013, p. 342). There can nonetheless still be 
hope for change. 
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3.7 Conclusion: 
The Bush administration thought ‘bandwagoning’ would be successful in the 
Middle East after extrinsically introducing democracy in Iraq. US foreign intervention 
was successful to a certain degree by forcibly ousting Saddam. US aid resulted in the 
formation of the Coalitional Provisional Authority (CPA) that served to facilitate the 
transition to democracy and help in the reconstruction of the nation (Brynen et al., 
2012). US interests in Iraq were achieved, but stability became inconsistent and long 
term optimism post-Saddam was transitory. The Iraqi nation is continuously facing 
corruption, instability and sectarian tensions in government and society. Insurgencies 
and escalating terrorism has translated into religious and ethnic ground battles and 
massacres. The costs of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have consequentially shifted to 
the succeeding US administration. Obama’s foreign policy towards the Middle East has 
also been tainted to a certain extent by Bush’s big-stick diplomacy in Iraq. The next 
chapter will analyze Obama’s soft-realist policy towards Syria’s civil war, Bashar al-
Assad’s authoritarian regime, and will offer valuable suggestions by political authors for 
US policy alternatives in Syria. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Obama and the Syrian Conflict 
4.1 Introduction: 
Barack H. Obama can be described as being part of the traditional Jeffersonian 
school within the Democratic Party. Obama believed that Bush “had put the United 
States on a suicidal course” (Lizza, 2011, para. 4). In his view, ideological conflict does 
not call for intervention and is not a hindrance to strategic relations between nations with 
opposing ideologies. His foreign policy goal comprises the minimization of US costs 
and risks overseas. According to Mead (2010), the current US president believes 
democracy can be best championed by becoming the exemplar of moderation in foreign 
policy and supporting peace at home. Obama had once stated in a presidential campaign 
prior to 2009 that he wanted to endorse a Ronald Raegan approach that would comprise 
of working with authoritarian leaders for regional security and stability and in return, 
help these nations to gradually democratize. This kind of endeavor would occasionally 
not prioritize the spread of democracy and might deemphasize pledges for human rights, 
but that would be the price to pay for having tyrannical leaders sit at the table. This 
method distances itself from the negative perceptions of US foreign policy that was the 
result of Bush’s “Freedom Agenda” in the Middle East region (Lizza, 2011). This 
chapter will describe Obama’s foreign policy in Syria so we can better understand his 
actions in the Middle East, while trying to discover if there is a concrete Obama 
doctrine.   
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4.2 The Evolution of Realism in US Syria Policy:  
 Since the presidency of Ronald Reagan, the United States pursued a realist 
foreign policy towards Syria. Notwithstanding Syria’s name appearing on the 1979 US 
State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism and its continuous brutal repression 
of the Syrian people (including the Hama Massacre in 1982), its geopolitical position 
has always played a pivotal role in the region. In the 1970s and early 1980s, with the 
Soviet Union posing an overarching threat in the Middle East, the Reagan administration 
engaged with the Syrian Baath regime through diplomacy knowing that the latter can 
harm or advance US interests in the region. Syria provided stability by playing by the 
rules of balance-of-power in the Middle East, especially in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. A 
moderate-realist foreign policy towards Syria remained on Washington’s agenda until 
George W. Bush’s presidency. Despite the Syrian regime providing the US with helpful 
intelligence on al-Qaeda after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Bashar al-Assad’s regime faced 
a choice between two political camps active in the region: the US and its principal ally 
Israel or its own regional allies Hezbollah and Hamas. 
By the spring of 2002 the US had already labeled Syria as a “rogue state”. And in 
December 2003 matters started to deteriorate when the US Congress, with bipartisan 
support, passed the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act 
(SALSRA) that pushed for new sanctions condemning Syria for its support of Hezbollah 
and aiding the insurgents in Iraq. The Bush administration dealt with Syria by utilizing 
“opposition through isolation”. Despite being affected by the economic recession, the 
US sanctions and falling global oil prices, this tactic did not produce any substantial 
changes within the Syrian regime (Sadat & Jones, 2009, p. 96). According to Sadat and 
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Jones, “the neoconservatives in the Bush administration exploited the democratic-peace 
theory to justify their actions against Iraq and potentially against other nations such as 
Iran and Syria” (Sadat & Jones, 2009, p. 97). Nonetheless America’s isolationist policy 
towards Syria left a political vacuum to be filled by the adversaries or allies of the US. 
European nations such as Britain and France, critical of the Syrian regime, continued to 
deal with Syria on economic terms in hopes that it can encourage and entice the Syrian 
government to democratize. This kind of interaction is a fundamental tenet of the 
neoliberal theory which claims that the growth of economic and political 
interdependence can develop incentives for cooperation, therefore deterring military 
confrontation. Sadat and Jones (2009) suggest that a moderate-realist approach would be 
sufficient in opposing Syrian government actions that might contradict US national 
interests. On the other hand, the liberal approach can also protect US interests in the 
region when Syria, in return for assistance, can act as an architect of peace. 
In 2009, the Obama administration started to employ a moderate-realist approach 
along with a liberalist commitment that would induce Syria to gradually introduce 
democracy and open up its financial market, therefore allowing more maneuvering and 
hopefully lessen oligarch control of businesses. Yet this policy would barely be tested 
due to the Syrian regime’s crack down on public protests that emerged peacefully in the 
early spring of 2011. One has to ask, if the uprisings had not taken place what would be 
the status of US and Syria relations today? Would Syria have been en route towards 
reform? We can only speculate but never really know how circumstances might have 
differed.    
During the Cold War years, the US engaged in a realist foreign policy in the 
Middle East in order to contain and defeat the Soviet Union’s aim of global communism. 
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The opposition movements in the region were regarded “as cat’s paws for Moscow” 
(Singh, 2011, p. 17). The US snubbed democratic values and turned a blind eye to the 
maltreatment of populations by authoritarian regimes even after the defeat of the 
Soviet’s overarching goals. Now and as the Middle East experiences a proverbial 
tornado of social upheavals against ruling dictatorships, the US and its allies must work 
even harder to protect their interests and find resolutions for the regional conflict. The 
US can aid in the liberalization process by establishing stable alliances with the people 
and not just the regimes. With its efforts the US can guarantee technical and financial 
assistance that will help in building the proper political institutions for elections. They 
must generate space and forums for political debate while at the same time cease any 
attempts by internal and external extremists that can hinder genuine democratic projects. 
The US should also redirect its economic approach by aiding initiatives that can boost 
entrepreneurship and national economic prosperity without relying on Western 
assistance. The US has also modified its ‘Millennium Challenge Corporation’ approach 
to help build local ventures and enable indigenous reform (Singh, 2011, p. 20).  
Syria has experienced forms of democratic trials in 2000 when Bashar al-Assad 
first inherited his presidential role after the passing of his late father, Hafez al-Assad. It 
was short-lived and ultimately collapsed. Notwithstanding moderate economic reforms, 
the government was not tolerant of legitimate democratic initiatives originating from 
dissenters and the Syrian public. Since the rise of the Arab Spring, Syria was eventually 
affected by these revolutions and the future of Syria remains unpredictable. The Syrian 
regime is again clamping down on democracy efforts, and introduction of reform and 
regime change seems bleak at this point. The next segment is about the rise of the Syrian 
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revolts, and how it has affected US strategic interests and foreign policy towards Syria 
and the Middle East region.   
 
4.3 The Syrian Revolt: 
When the Arab uprisings took the region by storm, it also caught Washington by 
surprise. Past US administrations had felt that the best way to promote stability in the 
region would be to support authoritarian regimes in order to prevent countries from 
transforming into communist or Islamist rule in the short-run with hopes that democracy 
would be gradually attained in the long term. Nader Hashemi states that “stability was a 
code word for support of authoritarian regimes that protected US interests from hostile 
forces emerging from within and outside the region” (Hashemi, 2012, p. 32). The danger 
inherent in times of upheaval can be seen in the example of Iran’s 1979 revolution, 
where what started as a movement for democracy culminated in the Islamic Republic 
that became antagonistic to US interests. If the Middle East would follow the path of 
South Korea or Taiwan, which incrementally experienced reform in the 1980s, then 
transition to democracy would be highly probable without necessarily destabilizing the 
relationship between the US and its allies. Following the Arab Spring uprisings, it 
became apparent that generational changes in the hereditary politics of the Middle East 
could not be maintained any longer in the hopes that second generations, such as Hosni 
Mubarak’s son Gamal Mubarak for example, would “drain the swamp” through gradual 
democratization (Gvosdev & Takeyh, 2012, p. 12). This bipartisan approach for 
maintaining stability in the Middle East was abandoned in the face of realism, when 
Bush Jr. changed the course of US foreign policy to unilateral “muscular” Wilsonianism. 
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And realism, whether intense or soft, is still embedded in Obama’s foreign policy. 
Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Ray Takeyh (2012) believe that the US became more prepared 
to intervene directly if intervention would bear quick and minor costs with hardly any 
checks from other major powers that oppose interference. The primary example of this 
was ‘Operation Odyssey Dawn’ in Libya where a multinational coalition with US 
participation was instrumental in removing Gaddafi from power. However, until the 
present day we have not seen the likes of Operation Odyssey Dawn repeated in Syria, 
where humanitarian concerns and need for aid are more pressing. The US is targeting 
ISIS militants with airstrikes but the government forces of Assad are not on the target 
list and the Obama administration is clear to point out that this is not an action against 
the Syrian government. The US president perceives stability at this point as the safest 
position. A governing void in Syria is now being filled by extremist Salafi-jihadi groups 
like ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front. The secular opposition movements in Syria have 
further weakened and divided with the upsurge of these groups and lack of Western aid. 
While the US cannot afford another war such as the one it initiated in Iraq, it still must 
feel the need to act in Syria to achieve its national interests, including but not limited to 
halting the atrocities of Bashar’s regime, reigning in the ISIS terror attacks and also with 
an eye at restraining Iran’s nuclear capabilities. 
After Bashar came to power, there was a promise of political and economic 
reforms (the stillborn Damascus Spring in 2000-2001). However, even though demands 
were calculated and reformers never called for outright regime change, these tolerated 
movements were later suppressed. Regardless of political change not becoming 
substantive, economic reform did somehow materialize. Some of the improvements 
included liberalization for commodities such as diesel, gasoline fuel and electricity, the 
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establishment of a stock exchange and licensing of private banks. The irony was that the 
Baath regime’s original socialist policies with urban workers and peasants serving as the 
social base of the regime were soon replaced with a predatory neoliberal economy 
merged with authoritarian forces. In effect, this economic corruption triggered the rise of 
the social revolts within Syria.  
The US kept silent during the first few months of the Syrian upheaval because 
Syria was still regarded as a valuable asset that could help maintain “the current 
hegemonic structure of power in the region” (Dahi & Munif, 2012 p. 329). Bashar’s 
regime had been aiding the US in its global war on terror, in providing critical 
information through the intensive torture of Syrian civilians. As the protests and brutal 
crackdowns continued, Bashar’s government lost its authority in the region and there 
were countless casualties due to the use of chemical weapons and the Syrian regime 
became more a liability that must be eliminated. 
Israel’s alliance with the US is also based on preserving stability in the region, 
while simultaneously preventing radicalization and religious zealotry. Israel views the 
Arab Spring revolts, in what Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described as, 
“Islamic, anti-Western, anti-liberal, anti-Israeli and anti-democratic wave” (Hashemi, 
2012, p. 44). Israel’s objectives are similar to the objectives of US foreign policy in the 
Middle East region, and it primarily prefers the conservation of the pro-Western 
authoritarian regimes as a vital guarantee to its security in the region. Martin Indyk 
claims that the US has two main interests that it must protect in the Middle East region; 
the flow of the Persian Gulf oil and Israel’s safety (Atlas, 2012). The following part is 
about Washington’s policy options in Syria, presented by political authors and based on 
analysis of the exacerbating situation and its impact on US national interests and global 
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political position. It also includes two interviews: one conducted with Obama and the 
other with Hillary Clinton, concerning their opinion about Syria’s war and US policy 
choices in finding a resolution for the conflict.   
 
4.4 US Policy Options in Syria:  
The vital and difficult question to answer today is how long will this conflict 
continue? Who will help the Syrian people realize their human rights and freedom of 
political determination? It seems Obama has so far been exerting a soft realist policy 
towards Syria in his rhetorical condemnation of the regime, while simultaneously 
applying a Jeffersonian idealist approach from afar.    
Seth Kaplan (2008) is a proponent of incremental reform instead of dramatic 
change by Western intervention, since ‘hard landing’ can be explosive and chaotic 
especially in a country like Syria divided among ten sects. Its formal institutions are too 
weak and inexperienced to introduce democracy. Political and economic reforms must 
occur in a piecemeal fashion. Kaplan (2008) understands that in order to introduce and 
consolidate Western-Style democracy, security and unity are key elements. Therefore 
the Baath regime’s powerful security apparatus and its social-welfare program could act 
as a means to achieve democracy. An effective recommendation would be to develop a 
Syrian National Security Council (SNSC), similar to that of Turkey’s National Security 
Council (NSC). It can take on the role of an all-powerful judicial body, to oversee that 
changes are applied smoothly under unity and a secular nature. Membership would be 
based on a negotiated agreement that would allow the representation of the five major 
communal groups. Although this group might offend the democratic purists because it 
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can inhibit democracy in its organic form, Washington in association with the UN can 
opt for technical assistance for Syria’s institutional reforms along with entry to foreign 
markets in exchange for Syria’s gradual democratization process  
From a military perspective, there are only a few options on the table for the 
current US administration to pursue. Sorenson (2013) outlines the five military options 
offered by chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey. Three of them 
include: Train, advice and assist the opposition; Control of chemical weapons; and 
Establishment of a no-fly zone (Sorenson, 2013, p. 8). While General Dempsey reviews 
a few potential courses of action, he fails to provide the desired outcome or the plan of 
the military force in achieving them. Nevertheless each action must be calculated before 
its implementation. Without a cautious and preconceived strategy, the situation will only 
exacerbate. Sorenson (2013) asserts there are no feasible military options that will do 
much to stop the Syrian violence. The danger with sending sophisticated arms to 
legitimate rebels is that they might fall into the hands of Salafi-jihadists that are 
antagonistic to Western interests. Arming rebels will only lead to “more inconclusive 
fighting, whatever the US motive” (Sorenson, 2013, p. 10). A no-fly zone on the other 
hand is ambiguous at this point, since the Syrian regime mostly relies on ground forces. 
A limited air strike can cause major damage to innocent civilians especially if there are 
chemical weapons among the regime’s artillery. If the US will militarily intervene then 
the possible outcomes include Assad remaining in power, secular opposition groups 
gaining governance control and instituting democratic elections and reform, or Sunni 
jihadists or even ISIS prevail and gain control of most of the territories. In any case, 
there is a risk that the situation will worsen or at the very least that collateral damage 
will be much greater with the US military exercising its full force and that reconstruction 
63 
 
of Syria will be prohibitively expensive. There is also the real and dangerous risk of 
having the sectarian conflict spread over Syria’s borders and there has already been 
some escalation in military confrontation in the Eastern-Bekaa region of Lebanon. 
Washington must work on containing the situation within Syria by also strengthening 
local powers that it views as friendly. No one in the region can afford the expansion of 
Syria’s civil war that can further add a destructive chasm between the Shiites and Sunnis 
of the region.  According to Sorenson (2013), America will lose in both situations. If it 
does not take action it will look weakened and if it does respond with an attack the 
situation will further escalate without a feasible exit strategy. The US does not 
equivocally share the same interests of the Alawite government. Bashar’s regime has 
nowhere to go and everything to lose if it does not fight to the death. At this stage, the 
US administration should present its directive policy with valid credibility supporting it. 
The US Presidential elections are not far from now and former Secretary of State 
Hillary Rodham Clinton (Goldberg, 2014) is trying to distance herself from Obama’s 
policy which she has described as a “failure” that has kept the US on the sidelines when 
it had the chance to screen, train, and arm what would later become the Free Syrian 
Army during the earlier phases of the Syrian conflict. Clinton does not agree with what 
Obama has self-declared to be his guiding principle in this conflict: ‘Don’t do stupid 
stuff’. She recants his slogan by asserting that “great nations need organizing principles, 
and ‘Don’t do stupid stuff is not an organizing principle” (Goldberg, 2014, para. 7). It 
can at best serve as a general principle to not get carried away with another vision of 
enforcement. She later does offer a subtle defense of his position and explains that his 
statement can be understood as a political message and not his perception of what’s 
happening in the world today. Obama is cautious because he inherited two wars, and an 
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ailing economy. He is trying hard to remove the US from the predicament it was in at 
the start of his presidency. The problem that lies in US foreign policy from the time of 
George W. Bush through Barak Obama’s presidency is that it has wavered back and 
forth between two extremes; one being a muscular unilateral interventionist policy; and 
the other, a “don’t do stupid stuff” approach in order to avoid a malicious problem like 
Syria’s war. Hillary warns us that when there is a political vacuum in nations that barely 
have the means to nurture their broken societies and are trying hard to achieve 
nationalism, there will be immoral figures, such as jihadists trying to fill that empty 
space (as happening today in Syria). The best approach to restrain this challenge would 
be, “containment, deterrence and defeat” (Goldberg, 2014, para. 14). An example of this 
can be seen in recent history when though despite some of the measures taken to 
overcome communism were unethical or distasteful in many aspects, the preliminary 
overarching plan of defeating the Soviet Union was successful.   
Former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger (2012) claims that US foreign 
policy should not be blamed for the present havoc in the region, nor can it solve all the 
shortcomings in a nation’s domestic issues and policy. Nevertheless, when Bush 
reviewed past US policy in the Middle East, he stated in a famous 2003 speech, “Sixty 
years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the 
Middle East did nothing to make us safe - because in the long run stability cannot be 
purchased at the expense of liberty” (Hashemi, 2012, p. 33). The US for many years, 
ignored the voice of the suppressed indigenous people that were longing for democratic 
values and self-determination, in order to attain stability in the region. Nader Hashemi 
(2012) claims that the true root of political division within these nations does not reside 
in the fact that populations segregate into pro-Western and anti-Western camps but that 
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the true struggle is between enduring regimes and the people they preside over. In 
contrast to Hashemi’s contention, the West colonial powers were replaced by Arab 
autocrats that accommodated US interests in the region, eventually causing a rift 
between the West and the people in the Middle East. In effect, it became easier for the 
US to work with authoritarian regimes who would secure the regional balance-of-power, 
which as a result caused resentment and revolutionary aspirations among the masses. 
Hashemi (2012) underlines that the problem was that the West clearly disregarded the 
broader aspirations of the local people, further building skepticism and mistrust of US 
strategic interests. 
According to Kissinger (2012), the US is deeply perplexed by Syria’s situation. 
It has a strategic interest in ending the alliance between Assad’s regime and Iran which it 
is unwilling to acknowledge and the humanitarian purpose of saving innocent lives that 
cannot unanimously be agreed upon in the UN Security Council. US effort must fall 
within the framework of its strategic interests. Although its direction has not been 
clearly delineated, it is willing to support democracy in the Middle East provided that 
the means to this change is compatible with its national interests and finds a harmonious 
counterpart in the interests and values of the regional aspirants. The subsequent part of 
this chapter discusses the tenets of realism and idealism and their sway on the US 
decision-making process regarding foreign policy in Syria. 
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4.5 The Tensions between Realism and Idealism in Obama’s Syria 
Policy: 
The realists have always warned about indigenous people seeking a sense of self-
determination and nationalism and caution against applauding idealism’s spread of 
democracy and urging to join the US bandwagon. With the emergence of the Arab 
uprisings, the US will find it increasingly difficult to impose the policies they have 
traditionally applied and followed in the Middle East. Even if these new movements 
may seem moderate and cooperative at first, their volatile nature means they may 
potentially transform relatively rapidly and become anti-Western. The world has already 
witnessed this kind of experience with President Gamal Abdel Nasser and his aspiration 
for pan-Arab nationalism in the region. The US administration will support the 
democratization processes of other states as long as it does not counter its interests. 
Another example of US clash of interests with a Middle East form of democracy was 
Turkey’s temporary fallout with the Bush administration in the lead-up to Iraq’s 
invasion, when the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan sided with the 
Turkish public opinion against aiding the US to open a second battlefront from the north, 
across the Turkish-Iraqi border. The US reaction was a backlash against the freest and 
most inclusive Turkish regime after years of an intrusive authoritarian rule by the 
military. Former Deputy Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz criticized their lack of 
cooperation and even wished that the military had played a major role in shaping 
Turkey’s decision as the war on Iraq was being planned (Hashemi, 2012). 
Atlas (2012) points out the weakness of both realism and idealism: the former is 
cynical because it tolerates regime repressiveness and human rights abuses, while the 
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latter seems to be naïve as it often contradicts the “realities” of the international system 
and power politics. Humanitarian interventions and waging wars to change regimes and 
spread democracy oppose the tenets of realism. But it is also true that, as Morgenthau 
contended, realism also “saves us from moral excess and political folly” (Atlas, 2012, p. 
355). The next section examines the reasons why the US and its European allies opted to 
militarily intervene in Libya’s conflict while choosing to limit its interference in Syria’s 
brutal civil war. It also explores the possibility of a perceptible Obama Doctrine that acts 
upon US military force and can be applied when necessary.     
 
4.6 Intervention in Libya and Non-Intervention in Syria: 
The case of Libya appears to be more of an “anomaly” rather than a US model 
for future humanitarian-military intervention in the Middle East. Atlas (2012) discusses 
the “Obama Doctrine”. Some of its key elements include: “an imminent threat of 
massive state violence against civilians”; “air power only-no boots on the ground”; “the 
mission must be consistent with both US interests and American values” (Atlas, 2012, p. 
370). Most importantly the operation must be in partnership with a multilateral military 
coalition so the US can also share the burden of costs with them. Libya’s struggle 
contained all of these features. It is becoming more apparent that an “Obama Doctrine” 
is too exacting in its criteria and demanding in its qualification and thereby excludes 
many nations from military intervention as part of US foreign policy as is the case with 
Syria. It can be a valid viewpoint to claim that no “Obama Doctrine” actually exists and 
that it is more of a rule of inaction which allows for some specific exceptions. Obama 
entered the presidential arena with a promise to move away from a crusading policy in 
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spreading democracy (ideology) and to treat US course of action based on protection of 
strategic interests, detached from a pre-conceived fixed set of ideologies. Another weak 
point of Obama’s approach and the UN-sanctioned NATO’s plan at the time in Libya 
was that there was no clear endpoint for the military operation. Obama was perceived as 
making plans which have limited scope but no clear goals and this uncertainty may have 
played a role in making Russia and China not buy into the US plan for sanctions against 
the Assad regime and veto that decision in the UN (Atlas, 2012). An additional 
interesting argument against a strike akin to ‘Operation Odyssey Dawn’ in Syria is the 
geographic landscape. Syria’s urban and rural areas are highly populated unlike Libya 
whose inhabitants are scattered in a massive desert. Therefore, the Syrian army would be 
more problematic to defeat unlike Gaddafi’s forces.  
Amos N. Guiora (2012) believes that Obama’s policy falls short of enacting 
significant measures against Bashar’s regime. US policy directions have been ineffective 
and inconsistent (since Obama’s Cairo Speech in 2009). The other setback lies in the 
vagueness in the criteria for when international intervention is justified. What factors 
differ in the military intervention against Qaddafi’s regime directed by the US in 
comparison to non-intervention in Syria, when both regimes have massacred their 
people? At this point in time, the Assad regime’s atrocities against the Syrian public are 
far greater than what occurred in Libya. The elusiveness as to when intervention is 
warranted “is one of interpretation, subject to specific circumstances and particular 
interests” (Guiora, 2012, p. 272). There were barely any direct mutual interests under 
threat with Libya. Syria on the other hand for years was believed to be a “linchpin” in 
the Middle East peace talks. Guiora believes that the US being a superpower must 
strongly portray moral and military leadership. And the US president can reinstate 
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confidence in leadership by taking on responsibility to act even if criteria for 
intervention are ambiguous, and that this should not discourage Obama from helping the 
Syrian people. 
A coalition of international intervention, summoned by UN Security Council’s 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P), enabled by NATO and the use of military force by the 
US, defeated Gaddafi’s regime. Nonetheless, democracy and stability remain weak in 
Libya due to continuous corruption and societal division. Social disruption persists and 
groups of armed mafia-like militias refuse to unite under government authority and take 
on the role of an operative police force. The absence of a substantial development plan 
in establishing strong reform elements failed to consolidate democracy in Libya. The 
strikes against the Libyan army in March 2011 were effective because UN member 
states agreed to endorse R2P for Qaddafi’s crimes against Libyan civilians. Nevertheless 
this was a one-time approved operation. R2P’s drawback is due to its inconsistent 
selectivity by the international community, because member states act upon their 
national interests. The more that intervention in a troubled nation threatens the security 
interests of other states, the higher the potential costs of intervention and as a result the 
practice of R2P becomes unreliable. Syria acts as stabilizing force in the Middle East 
region with significant US allies surrounding its border. International military 
intervention in Syria will eventually put much more strain on US expenditure than Libya 
did and most likely produce dangerous risks and threats to the region and vital US 
interests (Nanda, 2012). 
One of the short-term lessons Williams and Popken (2012) mention that must 
essentially be learned from Libya’s experience and examined with vigilance are the 
benefits in planning for the “Day After” the storm has calmed and when transition must 
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progress. It is natural for new constituents to deal with challenges. They should try their 
best through planning and incentives to overcome these confrontations. Preparation 
beforehand can also aid in detecting and grooming future potential leaders and help 
collect the essential resources needed for a healthy democracy. A well-studied transition 
plan can allow local and international stakeholders to reinforce pro-democracy 
opposition activities. However, when undergoing transition that is prone to fragile 
circumstances and lacking a developed strategy and leadership, the remnants of the old 
rule or new authoritarians can try to retake the government. For example, a modified 
form of authoritarianism is the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in Egypt, 
as it managed to reinstitute itself in the government since the pioneers of Egypt’s 
democracy movement were inexperienced in the short time-span they had to grasp the 
reigns of power after the ousting of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Obama although 
described by some critics as inactive others scholars have characterized him as rationally 
associating realism and idealism together based on calculation of important realities and 
US strategic interests. The subsequent section is about Obama’s soft-realist policy in 
Syria and the factors that shape the US administration’s approach to the Syrian regime 
and civil war.  
 
4.7 Obama’s Soft-Realist Foreign Policy Towards Syria:   
In an interview with Thomas L. Friedman in August 2014, Obama made it clear 
that when a country is facing political and economic turmoil the problem must be dealt 
with from within. The government should essentially make compromises that voice the 
opinions of the various sects including the minorities. In order to combat corruption, the 
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leaders and people should take full responsibility in changing their cultures, and then at 
this point the US will help them to a certain extent. However, the democratizing agents 
must be the sole front-runners in leading the transition process. Obama’s insight on this 
issue recalls Henry Kissinger’s aforementioned argument that the US should not be held 
accountable for the problems in the Middle East nor should they provide all the answers 
to the problems in the domestic governance of other countries. He gives the example of 
the Iraqi Kurds who successfully seized an opportunity to evolve from within their 
national framework and progress forward in political self-determination by assuming 
direct accountability for their responsibilities and demonstrating a tolerance of other 
sects and religions. The Kurds are willing to work together on building a strong 
cooperative government and society and the US is keen on giving them that chance and 
come to their aid, especially in a time of genocide threats. The remainder of Iraq on the 
other hand cannot expect the US to bail them out again if they cannot realize their 
mistakes and fix them promptly. Obama’s interview with Thomas L. Friedman (2014) 
suggests that the US was ready to help and militarily intervene provided that the 
government and people agree to work together willingly, that the US has local and 
international allies capable of producing self-sustaining developments and can effect a 
plan for institutionalizing democracy for the “day-after”. According to Obama the 
maximalist position by the government must be discarded, because “sooner or later that 
government’s going to break down” (Friedman, 2014, para. 12). As for his opinion 
concerning Syria, supporting secular rebels in a deeply divided Syria is an extremely 
perilous challenge. To arm a group composed of white and blue collar men with barely 
any experience on the battlefields so they can put up an artillery fight against a well-
equipped army supported by Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, is a far-fetched idea. 
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Kissinger, and other scholars, describe Obama as “a hybrid president: a 
progressive pragmatist” (Atlas, 2012, p. 360). Atlas describes Obama’s policy since his 
first term as integrating the principles of both realism and idealism. The underlying 
rhetoric in many of Obama’s speeches concerning the Arab uprisings is based on one of 
the views of idealism, where right is preferred over might. It can again be echoed when 
Obama quoted Thomas Jefferson, in his 2009 Cairo speech: “I hope that our wisdom 
will grow with our power, to teach us the less we use our power the greater it will be” 
(Atlas, 2012, p. 359). Obama marginalized Indyk’s Middle East “exception”. The 
illusion of stability under false pretense, where people are really living in fear and under 
repression can no longer be accepted. Therefore since America believes that it represents 
the beacon of freedom, the US administration should advocate for democratic values and 
human rights, while simultaneously protecting its essential national interests and 
security. 
Hashemi (2012) thought that Obama was on the right trajectory concerning his 
policy towards the uprisings in the region. Obama declared he would fully support 
transitions to democracy. He eventually found a balance between American interests and 
values. Nonetheless he was willing to forgo the past US policy approach of siding with 
authoritarian regimes even if it meant to put US interests at risk to a certain extent. The 
Arabs needed a chance for their voices to be heard. However Obama’s policy 
concerning Syria’s turmoil has stopped there. It still is the same rhetoric; condemnation 
of Bashar’s regime, sanctions, promotion of reform by non-intervention and as author 
Fawaz Gerges stated, an adoption of a centrist-realist approach (Hashemi, 2012, p. 46). 
Obama has made it clear as long as US core interests and the safety of the homeland are 
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not threatened it will not act unilaterally. The US will try to build a broad coalition based 
on multilateral consensus (Atlas, 2014, p. 369).     
Aaron David Miller (2014) claims Obama’s Syria policy is held hostage to Iran’s 
maneuver. The US and Iran are working on a nuclear deal that Obama cannot disregard. 
Should he make the decision to militarily intervene in Syria, there is a significant chance 
that many members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard fighting along Syria’s army 
maybe among the casualties. This would set back the diplomatic talks between Iran and 
the US that have rekindled in the form of the Geneva interim agreement that took place 
on November 24, 2013 regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The talks seem to be heading 
in a positive direction and the last thing the US needs is to surround Iran’s ally, the 
Syrian Alawite regime, in the name of humanitarian intervention, particularly if backed 
by the Sunni Gulf monarchies. If Iran continues to develop its nuclear weapons, Israel 
might strike Iran thereby also involving the US in a broader regional conflict. Bashar’s 
ousting would diminish Iran’s influence in the region, including its sway in Lebanon 
through its conduit Hezbollah. On the other hand, Israel’s apprehension will dangerously 
intensify since Sunni-extremists have the chance of taking over the Syrian government 
post-Bashar. The Syrian president justifies that the legitimacy of his regime opposes the 
Islamists that represent terrorisms and are hostile towards US intentions. Obama, having 
chosen a soft realist policy approach in Syria up until this point, now needs to work hard 
in convincing Bashar to step down and Iran to terminate its nuclear plans. Will this 
strategy work in the two years left of his last term?  Miller (2014) believes the results 
will be undesirable for the president due to the unpredictable nature of the political 
world particularly in the Middle East region.     
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Ryan Lizza (2011) has attempted to explain Obama’s policy and define whether 
there is an Obama doctrine, meanwhile noting that this question continues to frustrate 
the US president’s aides while they compare Obama’s approach to former British Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan’s strategy of dealing with conflicts as “events”. Obama 
succeeded Bush at a time when American exceptionalism was declining worldwide 
because of two wars, a failing economy and an austere national budget. Obama began 
his presidency with a promise to retract US foreign policy from missions based on 
ideology and politics and bring back realism calculated according to “ the sobering facts 
on the ground and our interests in the region” (Lizza, 2011, para. 4). In 2007 he claimed 
in one of his campaigns that the US’s criteria of intervention will not solely serve the 
purpose to stop genocides, if that was the case, US forces would have been all over the 
world trying to save those being massacred by their oppressive leaders such as in Congo 
or South Sudan. His assertion can be very well understood as a preconception on how 
Obama would deal with Syria’s strife in four years’ time until present day. Even when 
Obama had the chance to arm the rebels, he believes that those who argue it would have 
made a difference stand at odds with what is realistic, especially in fighting a trained 
army with hardened allies. According to Lizza, since Hosni Mubarak’s removal in 2011, 
“Obama’s ultimate position, it seemed was to talk like an idealist while acting like a 
realist” (Lizza, 2011, para. 17) Well in reference to today’s setting of political upheavals 
in the region, Obama’s strategy to a great extent remains the same since 2011. Syria’s 
sectarian divisions, those who are loyal to Bashar and those who loathe him, Israel’s 
security, Syria’s geopolitical position between friends of the US, its possible 
contribution to the peace talks between Palestinians and Israelis, its allies Iran and 
Hezbollah and among other troubling factors the escalation of ISIS and the risk its poses, 
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all adds to Obama’s indecisive decision and soft-realist foreign policy towards Syria. 
The US is also dealing with problems of its own including the specter of Iraq’s war, a 
divided congress and polity concerning whether or not the US should militarily 
intervene and strike the Syrian army. Brzezinski, while admiring Obama’s 
understandings and perceptions, believes the president’s weakness is that he lectures on 
what’s imperative when he should really be strategizing. In Obama’s view, foreign 
policy objectives can be hindered if American leadership is highly visible just as it can 
be strengthened by it. One of his advisers said that his policy in Libya can be regarded as 
“leading from behind” which is not a desirable slogan for the president of a world 
superpower (Lizza, 2011, para. 23). However we cannot blame Obama for all the 
problems in the world today, we must also be patient and wait and see how events will 
unravel in the Middle East, who will partner with the US and who will continue to defy 
its foreign policies and what opportunities should Washington seize and what bad 
choices must it avoid.     
Walter Russell Mead (2010), states that Jeffersonian foreign policy is often 
criticized by other schools of thought. Wilsonians think the Jeffersonian restraint 
approach of reducing US foreign endeavors, as a failure to act morally. Jacksonians, the 
far right conservatives, view the political nature of Jeffersonians as purely cowardice. 
And while the Hamiltonians share the same perceptions of limiting commitments abroad 
in specific circumstances, they believe that restraint can also wane American power 
when it should be projected adequately in dangerous situations. Jeffersonians are at 
conflict between limited realism found on their agenda and the idealist values of 
Wilsonianism that advocates their responsibility of saving lives for humanitarian 
purposes abroad. President Jimmy Carter faced this quandary when he dismissed 
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proposals allowing the Iranian Shah to crush protesters with violence. Although many 
critics perceive Jeffersonians as being too passive, for the latter a war would be the least 
attractive option to pursue because of its risks and costs. In a Jeffersonian assessment, 
the American model of democratic governance is an organic product of US history and 
unique American experience. It is not therefore a template that can readily be used to 
duplicate and mold democracies elsewhere. While critics of this view regard American 
exceptionalism as myopic, it nonetheless has served in preventing “imperial overstretch” 
and may also curtail the Obama administration, or future presidents to come, from 
embarking on ambitious and ill-conceived wars (Mead, 2010). It may be that this 
Jeffersonian approach, which values caution and restraint, is at the root of Obama’s soft-
realist foreign policy approach when it comes to the question of military intervention in 
Syria.       
 
4.8 Conclusion: 
 This chapter offers insights regarding Obama’s approach to policy towards Syria 
and Assad’s authoritarian regime. At this point the US, Europe and most Middle East 
nations are caught in a quandary with Syria’s escalating war and the rising threat of 
Salafi-jihadi groups that are continuously affecting the Middle East regional balance. 
Obama, in his Jeffersonian approach in dealing with Syria’s violent crisis, adheres to the 
principles of realism in trying to preserve the regional status quo and avert disruption, 
while also securing US strategic interests and pragmatically supporting democracy 
movements in the Middle East. He has made it clear by his policy in Syria that the US 
will not militarily intervene unless the Homeland’s critical interests are significantly 
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threatened or American assets are put in harm’s way. US military intervention in serious 
conflicts will take place if there is multilateral consensus from US allies and a well-
developed plan to implement democracy on the ground after strikes have destroyed 
targets. The next chapter, the conclusion, summarizes the focal points of the thesis 
argument and closes with a discussion of US foreign policy implications in Iraq and 
Syria and future research questions. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Conclusion 
5.1 Summing Up the Thesis:  
 When George W. Bush became president in January 2001, the world was moving 
past the Cold War era and many nations around the world were enamored with the 
dominance of globalization in international relations. Communism was gradually 
collapsing in Eastern Europe with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Francis Fukuyama 
became an overnight sensation in the political world when he claimed in his renowned 
essay, “The End of History”, that ideological evolution had been put to a halt because 
Western liberalism had successfully prevailed (Fukuyama, 1989)
2
. He further added that 
it will eventually influence the political and societal structure as much as it will affect 
the economic sphere. Fast forward to two decades later and in another part of the world, 
the Middle East, despots continue to this day to use brutal force and threats in order to 
further strengthen their power and consolidate the grasp of their regimes. It seemed that 
the inevitable spread of political and economic liberalization had for the most part 
skipped this region of the world.  
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks left the American people in shock over 
the tragic loss of thousands of innocent lives and in deep anxiety about their future and 
the new invisible enemy that had reached deep into their homeland. The US public and 
administration had strongly felt the wrath of the terrorists, who loathed US foreign 
                                                          
2 http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm 
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policy in the Middle East region. The Bush administration needed to retaliate and bring 
safety to the homeland, while protecting its national interests. Ideological evolution had 
not withered away and history did not ‘end’, it was yet again alive and will go on to play 
a prominent role in the Bush administration post 9/11. The events of that day, and the 
days to follow, were framed by Bush as a struggle between freedom and liberty against 
tyranny and terror. It was the axis of good in battle with the ‘axis of evil’. It was framed 
as an effort to neutralize a threat from weapons of mass destruction and as a quest to 
save Iraq and most importantly the US from a despot and introduce America’s ideal of 
democracy. In effect, the Bush administration marginalized the ‘traditional’ policy of US 
realism in order to promote the paradigm of idealism or what Mearsheimer (2005, p. 1) 
calls, “Wilsonianism with teeth”.  
The decision to invade Iraq and change its regime was not born in the aftermath 
of this attack, but rather had already been nurtured by regime change ‘hawks’ in US 
foreign policy discourse since the 1990s. In addition to the neoconservatives lobbying 
for this war, other US strategic interests were also served by invading Iraq, particularly 
the stability of oil reserves and the security of Israel. They naturally served as important 
elements but were not the sole driving factors. Bush was convinced that the root of the 
problem had originated from previous US policy that supported realism’s balance-of-
power and the status quo in the Middle East for too long. US administrations aligned 
themselves with authoritarian regimes at the cost of people’s liberty in the region. 
Deterrence and containment were no longer welcome in US foreign policy; they were 
believed to lead to failure in the long-run. In short, a neoconservative agenda had 
replaced realism. The neoconservatives portrayed themselves as crusaders for American 
values and culture. This substantially influenced their national interests which eventually 
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contributed to US foreign policy. Saving Iraq from a tyrant like Saddam would benefit 
the US by creating a friendlier Middle East while simultaneously securing US interests 
and ensuring the safety of the homeland.   
What would later become known as the ‘Bush Doctrine’ included four major 
elements that would sway public rhetoric in congress and among the American people. 
The first component was that of ‘big-stick diplomacy’ and the readiness to use 
overwhelming military power in a preemptive fashion to deliver a decisive and relatively 
quick change in factors on the ground. Termed “revolution in military affairs” (RMA), 
the advanced technological might of the US would devastate opposing forces and deliver 
such “shock and awe” that military action would be brief and costs would be limited. 
The second component, they anticipated, would come into play in the power vacuum 
that follows military victory, where the US implements changes that lay the foundation 
for a democratic process of self-governance in Iraq. This stems from the democratic-
peace theory and the belief that democracies are less likely to behave in an aggressive or 
malevolent manner towards other democracies. To the neoconservatives, the root 
problem in the Middle East was lack of democracy and, through this ‘muscular’ 
Wilsonian idealism of spreading democracy, they would remedy the situation in a 
fundamental manner that containment and deterrence would never have achieved 
(Mearsheimer, 2005). Thirdly, the Bush Doctrine theorized that nations around Iraq 
would learn lessons from the success of the war and subsequent democratization of Iraq 
and would surrender in fear of US global and military power and jump on the US 
bandwagon with minimal resistance. The bandwagoning logic, as Mearsheimer (2005) 
termed it, would spread democracy throughout the region as the “domino theory” would 
predict. All of the above would achieve the final component of the Bush Doctrine, which 
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was the main objective in the pursuit of the war in Iraq: maintaining a unipolar system 
while enforcing a US leadership stance facilitated by unilateralism. Big-stick diplomacy 
is best implemented under unilateralist decisions. The Bush administration purposely 
chose military force over diplomacy because the latter necessitates multilateral dialogue 
and compromise. There can be little chance of such diplomacy leading to a toppling of 
Saddam efficiently and effectively through an ‘RMA’ strategy. The US unilaterally side-
stepped the UN Security Council’s inaction to act in Iraq and primarily depended on its 
own military power in achieving its goal. 
  The Bush policy in Iraq was ultimately a failure. That failure was perhaps 
inevitable when we look at the components of the ‘Bush doctrine’ both collectively and 
individually. Collectively, there appears to have been a grave cognitive bias on the part 
of neoconservatives when they assumed that the elements of their plan would naturally 
follow each other in an inexorable sequence of events. What evidence did they have to 
support that idea? It seems there was very little besides wishful thinking. Jervis put it 
best when he said that “many of the reasons they give are rationalizations, not rationales, 
and come to their minds only after they have reached their decisions” (Jervis, 2003, p. 
318). Hinnebusch (2007) rightly claims that a different administration would have not 
invaded Iraq, but rather would have re-initiated the peace process or attuned its dual 
containment policy against Saddam.  
Individually, the elements of the Bush Doctrine also met with failure or were 
ineffective, and often results ran counter to aspirations. The Iraqi army in its traditional 
form was quickly defeated and dissolved when faced with the “shock and awe” 
campaign, but life on the ground remained far from safe and secure for many years 
following the start of the invasion and the declaration of “mission accomplished” from 
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the deck of a US aircraft carrier was arbitrary. The filling of the power vacuum with a 
democratic robust government was also flawed. In a deeply divided, sectarian, and 
multi-ethnic nation like Iraq, the attempted democracy was and remains a victim of 
“patronage, corruption and the consolidation of executive power” (Brynen et al., 2012, 
p. 56). Neighboring Arab states have been demanding democracy and reform but not 
because of bandwagoning and wanting to fall in line with the US policy in Iraq as much 
as due to organic and intrinsic bottom-up movements. US interests are still not secure in 
the Middle East and often fall under precarious situations. Arab Spring uprisings have 
destabilized the US administration’s long term allies such Egypt and the Gulf States and 
instead of weakening Iran’s regional sway, the war has buttressed the relationship 
between Iraqi Shiites in governmental positions and Iran, in effect strengthening the 
latter’s regional power.  
Ryan Lizza (2011) underlined how Obama lacked the intimate knowledge and 
experience in foreign policy shortly before the latter ran his first presidential campaign. 
Obama wanted to start afresh with less interaction in the Middle East and engage 
diplomatically with and lean towards Southeast Asian countries and engage the global 
economy. When Obama became president he was left to deal with the financial and 
political burden of two wars, not to mention the nursing of a troubled economy back to 
health. Prior to his presidential ascendancy in 2009, Obama vowed he would retreat 
from ideology and return to a realistic foreign policy generally based on hard actualities 
and US interests in the region. His approach to US foreign policy was to a large degree a 
Jeffersonian attitude, choosing to focus on domestic reforms rather than continuing 
Bush’s venture of applying global Wilsonian idealism. He wanted to safeguard 
American exceptionalism at home by freeing it from burdensome commitments abroad. 
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The hubris of the Bush policy had over-extended the ability of the US to act on the 
world stage and he believed a “highly visible American leadership can taint a foreign-
policy goal just as easily as it can bolster it” (Lizza, 2011, para. 23). His other endeavors 
when he entered office included tempering US national security policy centered 
primarily on the terrorism threat that was revived after 9/11. When uprisings came 
boiling to the surface across the Middle East in 2010 Obama publicly applauded calls for 
democracy and reform in some Arab nations, while also expressing some reservations 
about regime change in other countries, such as Egypt. Nonetheless, his reaction towards 
the revolts gradually shifted and support for maintaining the status quo and balance-of-
power was side-lined. In effect Obama seems to exert a rather soft-realist policy towards 
the Middle East. He strongly rejects imposing ideology on foreign nations. He believes, 
as he once stated in a 2006 speech, that the Bush administration used the goal of 
humanitarian intervention to engage in transforming of nations into democracies while 
exhausting the US military to a point that it averted attention away from the escalating 
real threats going on in the world.  
Many have questioned if there is a concrete Obama Doctrine that can be called 
upon to act in Syria’s current conflict. Obama has adopted a hybrid foreign policy 
framework with both realist and idealist themes. He has made it unambiguous that as 
long as US core interests and the physical safety of the homeland are not directly 
jeopardized, he is only willing to engage in military action based upon multilateral 
consensus and shared financial costs. As we have seen in the case of Libya, direct US 
contribution to multilateral humanitarian military action under the “Obama Doctrine” 
falls subject to the following mandatory requisites: “the mission must be consistent with 
both US interests and American values”; “an imminent threat of massive state violence 
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against civilians must be present”; “risk to US military personnel is minimized by 
relying primarily on air power with no boots on the ground” (Atlas, 2012, p. 370). Only 
exceptional circumstances would satisfy all these criteria and that goes a long way in 
explaining why the likes of the US military intervention in Libya has not recurred 
elsewhere in the Middle East. The US is targeting ISIS militants with airstrikes but the 
government forces of Assad are not on the target list and the administration is clear to 
point out that this is not an action against the Syrian government. For those who are in 
search of or are trying to theorize about an Obama Doctrine, in my opinion that is a 
fruitless pursuit. Obama is a strategist and he deals with grave global issues as “events” 
(Lizza, 2011), instead of endorsing an ideology or doctrine to act as a guideline 
comparable to the method of his predecessor. If there is an Obama Doctrine that entails 
the above-mentioned provisions then it is too demanding to occur with facility and its 
unknown vision and outcome would be met by suspicion from other nations. 
  In my opinion and based on my research, Bashar al-Assad’s regime is not 
considered a direct imminent threat to the US. Syria does not contain critical interests 
and security purposes that must be addressed as was the case in Iraq before 2003. 
Nonetheless, Syria does have a strong hold on the stability of the region, whether by its 
geopolitical significance located at the heart of escalating tension, or by a role as a key 
player in the Israeli-Palestinian peace talk efforts. Syria can still promote or sell US 
interests. Despite claims of Syria turning into a liability, it continues to serve as a 
significant resource in the balance-of-power in the Middle East region. If the US had not 
considered it to be valuable it would have reacted otherwise with strong measures 
against the Syrian regime, when it trampled over Obama’s cautionary “red line” 
regarding use of chemical weapons against innocent civilians in the summer of 2013. 
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Obama is caught in a dichotomy between maintaining a constrained Jeffersonian realist 
foreign policy while occasionally adhering to some key elements of Wilsonian idealism.  
 If the US partnered with European and Middle East allies based on a multilateral 
agreement and intervened in Syria’s conflict and defeated Assad’s regime, its 
reconstruction will in all likelihood be too costly and commitments would probably 
outrun resources. At this point, the US and its European allies are strictly discouraged by 
their respective administrations and the public from intervening in Syria’s conflict out of 
fear of who might fill the empty Syrian vacuum post-Assad. With the threat of a 
growing ISIS and continuous sectarian conflicts, chaos and insurgencies will disrupt 
regional stability and US interests will possibly be in grave danger. Obama may also be 
choosing not to intervene in Syria’s civil war due to renewed nuclear talks with Iran that 
since 2013 have been building a moderately optimistic foundation between the two 
countries. If the US chooses to intervene with direct military action in Syria, a strike 
against the Syrian army will most likely also include causalities from the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard, the active military component of Iran’s current support for the 
Assad regime. Ultimately talks will unravel and Iran’s nuclear capabilities may advance 
and become a dangerous threat against the US and its allies (Miller, 2014). 
 
5.2 The Way Forward for US Middle East Policy: 
What is the way forward from here for the US and its foreign policy? How will 
the unraveled threads come together once more to move this region forward? Michael 
Singh (2011) along with other political activists and scholars prescribe ways in which 
the US can help opposition movements achieve democracy while fighting against 
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corruption and forms of authoritarianism. Assistance can be delivered in the form of 
support for overcoming economic challenges since democracy cannot overcome 
corruption on its own and they both have an equally substantial effect on each other. 
Recommended efforts include increasing sanctions against kleptocracy and corrupted 
government officials, stimulating local economic growth, providing technical and 
financial aid without nurturing dependency. These measures can build and improve 
political institutions which are indispensable in providing elements of reform and 
democracy, such as free elections, political debates and deliberations, forums, use of the 
media and Internet penetration (Singh, 2011, p. 18-19). Singh also asserts that an 
alliance must also develop between the US administration and the indigenous people, 
since the latter’s frustration and animosity towards the US emanates from America’s 
friendly association with the authoritarians. Hillary R. Clinton and David S. Sorenson 
believe that at this point and with events unraveling impulsively and dangerously, the 
US must work on containing the situation within Syria before its implodes and affects 
the whole Middle East region as a religious sectarian war with no boundaries. This will 
eventually take a costly toll on the rest of the world, including US national and strategic 
interests. 
If the US approaches the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an honest and sincere 
broker for peace and sets a goal of achieving a two-state solution while at the same time 
taking into account reasonable Arab demands, this can be advantageous for the Obama 
administration or its successor and can reshape Arab public perception of the US in a 
positive light. It would also safeguard the long-term success of US foreign policy in the 
region (Atlas, 2012, p. 380). As for reform in Syria, the US and its allies will have to 
protect and tend to the legitimate security apprehensions of the Syrian minorities, such 
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as the Christians and Alawites, in order to encourage and achieve democratic transition 
within Syria (Atlas, 2012, p. 374).  
Obama can also learn from the second-term of his predecessor. Bush in his 
second tenure became more hands-on in the management of foreign policy issues and 
opted for more diplomatic approaches in international settings. He reshaped his team 
while at the same time he addressed and tried to correct the past errors of his 
administration. He dealt with micromanagement matters such as weekly 
videoconference meetings with his team in Iraq and regular interactions with former 
Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki (Rothkopf, 2014). 
Syria’s conflict in the eyes of Washington is viewed as a domestic issue to be 
dealt with within its borders. Nonetheless, the disorganization of internationally 
recognized Syrian opposition group does not explain or justify one of the reasons as to 
why the US cannot militarily intervene and help the authentic revolutionaries. Amos 
Guiora argues even though international law lacks normative standards to intervene for 
humanitarian purposes, it does not excuse inconsistent policy. National leaders have the 
responsibility to take action, especially Obama being the president of the sole 
superpower in the world today. However, and without being defensive or biased towards 
any president, Obama is exerting a calculated soft-realist foreign policy and as long as 
US core interests and the safety of the homeland are not in serious danger, he believes 
his adopted approach can contain, at least for the near future, issues arising from the 
Middle East today. 
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5.3 Future Thoughts: 
 When political scientists analyze and dissect the policy of the Bush 
administration and discuss the results of the Bush Doctrine in the Middle East, they have 
the benefit of hindsight due to the amount of time that has passed since those policies 
were implemented. They can examine causes and their effects, assess decisions and their 
aftermaths. When it comes to the situation in Syria and the Obama policy regarding the 
Assad regime, events are still unfolding at a rapid rate and repercussions of his policy 
are not as clear. 
 Comparisons between the foreign policy of the US under Presidents Bush and 
Obama that have been made in the preceding chapters have focused on the role of 
ideology and the schools of thought which brought these policy choices to bear. Future 
research can further this comparison by contrasting not only the policies themselves and 
their origins but also their short and long-term effects and results. Once enough time has 
elapsed for events in the Middle East to unfold we will be witness to those results and 
whether the interests of the US, its allies in the region, and the states of the Middle East 
as a whole were better served by the soft-realism of Obama than by the idealism of his 
predecessor. A new administration will be at the helm of the US in two years. Will that 
administration and the new president continue with the current approach or will we see a 
reversal to Bush-era policies like a pendulum swinging back and forth between these 
two different political schools of thought? Will a new hybrid emerge that draws a new 
path for the US in this complicated and troubled part of the world? Only time, and 
events on the ground, will tell. 
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